Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech by Moran, Timothy J.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 3
Summer 1992
Format Restrictions on Televised Political
Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without
Suppressing Free Speech
Timothy J. Moran
United States District Court Eastern District of Texas
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Moran, Timothy J. (1992) "Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing
Free Speech," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 67 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol67/iss3/3
Format Restrictions on Televised Political
Advertising: Elevating Political Debate
Without Suppressing Free Speech
TnioTY J. MoRAN*
The First Amendment ... is not the guardian of unregulated talkative-
ness .... What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said.'
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary political advertising presents an apparent dilemma for a
society striving to achieve the twin first amendment goals of robust unin-
hibited debate and informed self-government. Traditional free speech prin-
ciples hold that political speech, particularly when made in connection with
elections, should be completely free of governmental restraint. However,
many observers contend that the nature of political advertising impedes self-
government by creating advertising that at best lacks substance and at worst
obscures and distorts crucial issues.
This Article analyzes current proposals that would elevate political debate
by regulating the format of political advertising. It concludes that proposals
to restrict political advertising to a narrow issue-oriented format violate the
first amendment because they substantially reduce the quantity and commu-
nicative impact of political speech. However, similar goals can be achieved
by directly subsidizing political advertising-by vouchers or the award of free
air time-and by conditioning the receipt of this benefit on the candidate's
agreement to conform to an issue-oriented format of suitable length.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I summarizes what political
and media observers have found about political advertising. It concludes
that contemporary advertising does not promote a meaningful discussion of
issues and may distort them. However, research indicates that a "talking-
heads" format, in which the candidate simply addresses the camera without
the benefit of music or additional images, tends to produce more informative
and issue-oriented advertising. Part I concludes by summarizing proposals
to make advertising more informative and issue oriented.
* Law Clerk, Honorable William Wayne Justice, Eastern District of Texas. J.D., 1991,
Harvard University. The author thanks Professor Kathleen Sullivan, Harvard Law School, for
her comments and critical insight throughout the writing of this Article. Thanks also to Fred
Cate, Newton Minow, and Kathleen Mulligan, who read and commented on earlier drafts.
1. A. MELEOwH, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PowERs oF THE PEOPLE 26
(1960).
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Part II proposes a constitutional framework for analyzing format restric-
tions on political advertising. It argues that the extent of infringement on
individual autonomy-the individual's interest in advertising in whatever
manner she chooses-is largely irrelevant to a proper first amendment
analysis. Instead, a restriction should be judged by the degree to which it
advances the government's interest in informed and rational political debate
without substantially reducing the quantity of speech, decreasing its com-
municative potential, inhibiting certain views, or creating the opportunity
for dangerous governmental interference with political speech. A restriction
that advances the government's interest in informed political debate and is
narrowly tailored to minimize the above threats to free expression is con-
stitutional.
Part III analyzes in depth four proposals to regulate the form of a
candidate's political advertising. One proposal would require that the can-
didate appear personally in any advertisement that attacks another candidate.
A second proposal would require that all advertising conform to a talking-
heads format. Part III argues that both of those proposals are unconstitu-
tional because they curtail the airing of a substantial degree of political
speech that can provide important information to voters and increase the
voters' participation in the political process. A third proposal, strengthening
disclosure and identification requirements, probably is constitutional if the
requirements are narrowly tailored. However, it is doubtful that this pro-
posal would significantly raise the level of public debate. The most promising
proposal is to add issue-oriented advertising to the political marketplace by
giving candidates free advertising, through either broadcast vouchers or free
air time. Candidates who accepted this benefit would be required to produce
advertising that uses a talking-heads format with a minimum length suitable
to the development and discussion of issues. Because candidates would
remain free to use their own funds to produce advertising of their choice,
regardless of whether they accepted the free advertising, this subsidy pro-
posal would not suppress any speech. This proposal is, therefore, consti-
tutional.
I. THE NATURE OF POLITIcAL ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION
A. The Controversial Role of Political Advertising
Televised political advertising (spots) substantially affects the content and
focus of election campaigns. 2 Spots account for a substantial percentage of
2. Books documenting the importance of televised political advertising include: E. DIAMOND
& S. BATES, TiM SPOT: Tim RISE OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION (rev. ed. 1988);
K. JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRrrIcisM OF PRESIDENTIAL CAM-
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total election costs.3 Consultants who create such advertisements are highly
sought after and play an increasingly important role in the substantive
decisions of the campaign. 4 And because spots permit candidates both to
communicate directly to the voter and to target certain voters in particular,5
they are often the most effective source of information about candidates
for voters. 6
The rising importance of spots, however, has generally not been ap-
plauded. Since spots first became prominent, critics have charged that spots
distort the issues, lack substance, and harm the political process.7 Since the
mid-1980s, such criticisms have intensified and have often been coupled
with calls for comprehensive legislative reform.8 The public is also dissatisfied
PAiGN ADvmTISo (1984); R. JOSLYN, MASS MEDIA AND ELECTIONS 195-214 (1984); M. KERN,
30-SECoND POLTICS: PoLrrxcAL ADVERTISING IN THE EIGHTImS (1989); NEw PERPspcTIvES ON
PoTcAL ADvERTISING (L. Kaid, D. Nimmo & K. Sanders eds. 1986) [hereinafter NEw
PERSPECTVEs]; M. PFAU & H. KENSxI, ATTACK POLMcs: STRATEGY AND DEFENSE (1990); R.
SPERO, TnE DupIN OF THE AMERICAN VOTER: DIsHoNEsTY AmD DECEPTION IN PREsmENTAL
TELEVISION ADVERTSNo (1980).
3. In 1984, Walter Mondale and Ronald Reagan spent a total of $50 million on television
advertising. Diamond & Marin, Spots, AM. BEAvoRAL SCmNTIST, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 382.
In 1980, television advertising constituted 70% of Ronald Reagan's total advertising budget
and accounted for nearly half of the total federal election funds received. Jimmy Carter spent
74% of his total advertising budget on television advertising. Devlin, An Analysis of Presidential
Television Commercials, 1952-1984, in NEw PERSPECTrVES, supra note 2, at 21. Below the
presidential level, television advertising generally consumes on average 25% of a congressional
candidate's campaign budget. L. SAATo, PAYING FOR ELECTIONS 26 (1989); Cundy, Political
Commercials and Candidate Image, in NEw PERsPEcTIvEs, supra note 2, at 210, 211.
4. See generally S. BLuumNTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN (1982); L. SABATO, THE RISE
OF POLICAL CONSULTANTS: NEw WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS (1981).
5. R. JOSLYN, supra note 2, at 73-76.
6. See T. PATTERSON & R. McCLuRE, POLITICAL ADvERTISING: VOTER REACTION TO
Tm.-visED PoLTcAL COmmERCIAXS 8 (1974) (Political commercials are an important source of
information for certain voters.). See generally Just, Crigler & Wallach, Thirty Seconds or
Thirty Minutes: What Viewers Learn from Spot Advertising and Candidate Debates, 40 J.
Comm. 3, 12 (1990) (Voters may learn more about candidates from advertising than from
candidate debates.).
7. See, e.g., VoTER's Tm: REPORT OF TH TWN CENTURY FUND COMMssION ON
CAmPAIGN COsT IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA 2 (1969) ("[D]oes a series of short 'spot' announce-
ments contribute as much to the voter's knowledge of the issues and of the candidates as
longer programs where issues are discussed and candidates are exposed to view? The answer
is almost certainly no."); T. PATTERSON & R. MCCLuRE, supra note 6, at 7.
Critics contend that televised ads fail to provide the voters meaningful informa-
tion, that they degrade the electoral process by selling candidates as if they were
soap, that they emphasize image-making while ignoring political issues, and that
they are designed to influence the least interested-and most easily misled-
voters.
Id.
8. See Hinerfeld, Why Political Ads Subtract, WASH. MONHaY, May 1990, at 12, 21-22;
Kamber, Political Discourse Descends into Trivia, ADvERTisiNG AGE, Feb. 25, 1991, at 20;
Daley, T. V. Holds Power in Politics: Tool of Enlightenment Dims Amid Hard Campaigns,
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 19, 1990, at 1, col. 2; Shogan & Rosenthiel, Latest Wave of Campaign
Reform Homes in on Media, L.A. Times, May 7, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (summarizing criticisms
and proposed solutions).
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with political advertising.9 Criticism typically has focused on three aspects
of contemporary spots: the failure of commercial advertising to present
detailed discussion of substantive issues; the use of commercial advertising
techniques; and the dominance of 30-second spots over longer ones.
B. The Content of Political Advertising
1. Image Over Substance
Political advertising on television today rarely presents detailed informa-
tion about substantive policy preferences and proposals.10 Instead, political
advertising concentrates on what loosely can be called image. A substantial
percentage of contemporary advertisements, for example, focus on the
personal attributes of a candidate, presenting her as a proven leader, as a
person in touch with working people." Other advertisements associate a
candidate with popular cultural myths or values. Such advertisements include
references to topics such as family values, American ingenuity, or the
scourge of crime and drugs. 12 Other advertisements may focus on issues
only in a vague and general way so as to appeal to commonly held values
rather than to discuss policy choices.13 Of considerably more substance is
advertising that either highlights the past accomplishments of a candidate
or details the policy failures of an opponent. 14 However, the information
presented through such advertising is necessarily limited both by the record
9. P. TAYLOR, SEE How TIY RuN: ELEcTmI TIm PRESIDENT IN AN AGE OF MEDIACRACY
7 (1990). Some observers have speculated that dissatisfaction with political advertising is linked
to lower voter turnout, but no evidence directly supports this contention. See Clean Campaign
Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 999 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 [hereinafter
1989 Hearings] (statement of Curtis Gans, Director, Committee for the Study of American
Electorate).
10. Joslyn, Political Advertising and the Meaning of Elections, in NEw PERSPECTVES,
supra note 2, at 139, 142-50 (Only 50 of political commercials contain specific policy
preferences. An additional 1001o contain fairly specific proposals.); R. JosLxN, supra note 2,
at 43 (Only 20% of political advertisements contain information specific enough about policy
preferences that a viewer could use it to predict a candidate's future policy behavior.).
11. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 40 (Political advertisements focus much more on impressions
of a candidate than on public policy preferences.); Joslyn, supra note 10, at 162 (Fifty-seven
percent of political advertisements concern the personal attributes of a candidate.).
12. Joslyn, supra note 10, at 173-78; see also Nimmo & Felsberg, Hidden Myths in
Television Political Advertising, in NEw PERSPECTIvS, supra note 2, at 248.
13. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 51 (Issues are mentioned in 89% of political ads, but such
references are generally vague.); Joslyn, supra note 10, at 149 (Most advertisements that
address issues contain "bogus policy appeals" that, because they appeal to "consensually held
values," "are without risk to the candidate and are a considerable distance from the types of
policy alternatives that public officials face." (emphasis in original)).
14. Joslyn argues that such retrospective policy appeals have considerable educative poten-
tial. Joslyn, supra note 10, at 151.
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of the two candidates and by the extent to which the information is useful
to the candidate who is making the advertisement. As a result, retrospective
advertisements generally do not offer a detailed or comprehensive discussion
of what policies a candidate should and will pursue in the future.15 As
Joslyn observes, "[tielevised ads simply do not typically provide the public
with the information flow necessary to permit the public to learn very much
about the contrasting 'bundles' of policy promises, preferences, or intentions
represented by candidates." 1 6
2. Commercial Advertising Techniques
The commercial techniques that dominate political advertising also make
advertising singularly ineffective at promoting meaningful discussion of
prospective policy choices. Political advertising today uses much of the same
techniques for selling candidates as commercial advertising employs to sell
products. 17 Commercial advertising is heavily regulated, 8 however, while
censorship of candidates' spots is forbidden. 19 The result is that the same
techniques, that Congress has determined are potentially dangerous enough
to require regulation when promoting commercial products are allowed free
reign when they are used to promote political candidates. 20
Several techniques are worth detailed analysis. First, political advertising
uses referential techniques in which either the candidate is associated with
something universally acknowledged to be good or the opponent is linked
to something generally acknowledged to be evil. 2' The disturbing aspect of
this technique is that it does not argue in any rational sense; it merely
asserts. Thus, advertisements have implicitly associated opponents with
15. See id. at 181, 182-83.
16. Id. at 182.
17. See M. KERN, supra note 2, at 23-24. The similarity between political and commercial
advertising techniques has been frequently explored. See L. SABATO, supra note 3, at 174-79;
R. SPERO, supra note 2; Albert, The Remedies Available to Candidates Who Are Defamed by
Television or Radio Commercials of Opponents, 11 VT. L. REv. 33, 54 (1986).
18. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates false and deceptive advertising pursuant
to its authority to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991). For examples of the FTC's regulation, see Albert,
supra note 17, at 49-51.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988) (Licensees may not censor advertisements aired by candi-
dates.).
20. It has been suggested that because political commercials sell candidates like soap they
should be regulated as heavily as commercial advertising. See R. SPERO, supra note 2, at 4-9
(arguing that networks would refuse to run almost all presidential campaign commercials if
they subjected them to the same standards that they do commercial advertising); Hinerfeld,
supra note 8, at 21.
21. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 30; Jamieson, The Evolution of Political Advertising in
America, in NEw PEasPECTrvES, supra note 2, at 14-18.
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everything from nuclear warn to rioting in the streets. 23 The favored can-
didate, meanwhile, is associated with good things such as family or pros-
perity. 24 In either case, the advertisements make the association without
offering any evidence to support it.21 Such advertisements make arguments
by visual associations that "defy conventional logic" and that could not
plausibly be made verbally. 26
There is some indication that an association must have enough plausibility
to resonate with the viewer. 27 Thus, implicit accusations that Barry Gold-
water would start a nuclear war "worked," 28 while advertisements in 1984
associating Ronald Reagan's presidency with pending economic collapse did
not.29 However, such referential advertising has power not because it offers
information to persuade viewers, but because it capitalizes on fears and
uncertainties that the viewers already have and it intensifies them.30
A second important feature of contemporary political advertising is its
preference for highly stylized images over the use of verbal messages and
facts. 1 Stylized images "are more powerful than words and words cannot
22. Lyndon Johnson's famous 1964 advertisement "Daisy" featured a young girl picking
flowers followed by a nuclear explosion. The implicit but unspoken assertion was that Barry
Goldwater would bring about nuclear war. See E. DIAMoND & S. BATES, supra note 2, at 127-
33; K. JAMIESON, supra note 2, at 198-200.
23. Richard Nixon's advertisements in 1968 intercut scenes of the war in Vietnam, poverty
in Appalachia, and rioting outside the Democratic convention with pictures of Hubert Hum-
phrey. See Jamieson, supra note 21, at 16; Jamieson, Our Appalling Politics: For Televised
Mendacity, This Year is the Worst Ever, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1988, at Cl, col. 1.
24. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 21, at 16 (describing John F. Kennedy advertisement
juxtaposing pictures of Kennedy with pictures of fields of grain, the Liberty Bell, and prospering
factories); Diamond & Marin, supra note 3, at 384-85 (describing George Bush advertisement
showing Bush with his granddaughter).
25. In associational political advertisements:
[iThe evidence required to sustain the implied linkage between the associated
images is absent. It is absent as well in product ads that link use of the product
with beauty, youth, fame, fortune, and friendship. In that they both rely on
argument by visual associations, this type of ad sells politicians the way soap is
usually sold.
Jamieson, supra note 21, at 17.
26. K. JAMIEsoN, supra note 2, at 198; Jamieson, supra note 21, at 17.
27. M. PFAU & H. KENSKI, supra note 2, at 24.
28. Viewers of "Daisy" apparently projected their own predispositions into the ad and
remembered hearing references to Barry Goldwater and an attack on his policies when neither
was actually present. K. JAMIESON, supra note 2, at 200.
29. Walter Mondale's 1984 advertisement "Rollercoaster" featured riveting shots of a roller
coaster climbing a steep hill juxtaposed with an offscreen announcer's warning that President
Ronald Reagan's policies would cause a recession. Viewers reported feeling anxiety but did
not believe that Reagan would cause these problems. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 122.
30. See Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising: The Role of Legal
Sanctions, 36 EMORY L. J. 853 (1987).
31. M. K sa, supra note 2, at 23 (A basic advertising principle is that "simple print-
facts, unadorned by visual and aural persuasion-can] not compete with visual imagery.").
[Vol. 67:663
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rebut images. ' 3 2 As a result, images can intensify the effectiveness of what
would be barely plausible assertions if made verbally. Furthermore, once
made, the image may remain evocative even if the factual basis upon which
it is based is later rebutted. The famous "Revolving Door" advertisement
of the 1988 George Bush campaign illustrates this principle.13 A number of
voters said that they believed that Michael Dukakis, Bush's opponent, was
"soft on crime." Yet, when asked to explain why they had come to believe
that, they did not refer to any facts or statistics but instead responded that
Dukakis had created a "revolving door" prison policy. Thus, the revolving
door image became a surrogate for facts and rational argumentation. 34
Another problem is that advertisers can easily exploit the visual aspect of
televised advertising to creat false and misleading impressions.35 An early
Dwight D. Eisenhower advertisement, "Eisenhower Answers America," gave
the impression that Eisenhower was directly addressing questioners when in
actuality both the answers and the questions had been taped independently.3 6
A John F. Kennedy advertisement used cuts and splices from the televised
debate to make it appear that Richard M. Nixon was mindlessly nodding
his head in agreement with Kennedy on a variety of statements. 37 As televised
advertisements have become more sophisticated, their deceptiveness has
become more subtle. The Bush campaign's revolving door advertisement,
for example, made the accurate statement that the Massachusetts prison
furlough program gave furloughs to first-degree murderers who were not
entitled to parole. This was followed by the statement that 268 escaped,
and the words "268 ESCAPED" were superimposed on the screen. In
actuality, 268 prisoners had escaped from the program, but only 4 of them
had been convicted of murder. The juxtaposition of words and pictures
gave the false impression that 268 first-degree murderers had escaped.38
Similarly, another Bush advertisement showed a filth-ridden Boston Harbor
and zeroed in on a sign that warned "Danger. Radiation. No Swimming."
The sign, however, came from a Navy yard that formerly repaired nuclear
submarines. Although the sign had nothing to do with the pollution of
32. Jamieson, Context and the Creation of Meaning in the Advertising of the 1988
Presidential Campaign, 32 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 344; see also M.
KERN, supra note 2, at 23.
33. The advertisement featured prisoners walking through a revolving door, while an
offscreen announcer details statistics about the.prison furlough program in Massachusetts. See
Devlin, Contrasts in Presidential Campaign Commercials of 1988, 32 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScI-
ENTIST, Mar.-Apr., at 389, 395.
34. Jamieson, supra note 32, at 419.
35. Jamieson, supra note 21, at 16 ("[Television's ability to reconfigure reality" presents
a "danger" that "false inferences" will be made.); Hinerfeld, supra note 8, at 13.
36. Jamieson, supra note 21, at 16. For a description of the advertisement, see E. DAMOND
& S. BATES, supra note 2, at 53-60.
37. Jamieson, supra note 21, at 16.
38. Devlin, supra note 33, at 395; Jamieson, supra note 32, at 416.
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Boston Harbor, its situation in the commercial gave the false impression
that it did.39
By using images, an advertiser can make false impressions that would
probably be too apparent if made verbally. Words by their nature must be
definitive if they are to have cognitive meaning. By contrast an image can
generate a number of impressions. Thus, Bush's revolving door advertise-
ment makes a statement that is technically true. The false inference comes
from the totality of the advertisement: the juxtaposition of the statements,
the words visually imposed on the screen, and the continuous procession of
prisoners coming through the revolving door. Because the advertisement
makes no explicitly false statement, it is difficult to attach culpability for
the misleading impression on either the candidate or the campaign; any
deceptiveness may seem unintentional. 40
The visual nature of advertising also enables campaigners to make subtle
appeals to the unconscious prejudices or predispositions of a voter. For
example, Kern explains how an advertisement featuring a professional man
and woman waiting for a bus exploits fears that male voters may have of
being overtaken by women in the workplace.
She: Is your Democratic congressman for higher taxes?
He: I'd better find out. (The bus pulls up, she gets on it, and it pulls
away. He is left behind, looking confused.) I'd better find out what
time the next bus is too.4'
As Kern notes, the advertisement links Democrats "with the governmental
Goliath in a fashion designed to suggest that the male professional ...
might ... be outdistanced by a female colleague if he does not vote
Republican."'42 The advertisement covertly appeals to sexism but in a way
that is not verbalized. Similarly, advertisements that feature children and
adults discussing a candidate appeal to voters' sense of obligation to their
parents.43 Still other advertisements have been accused of appealing to
racism. 44 In each case, the pattern is the same. The advertisement makes
39. Jamieson, supra note 23.
40. Jamieson makes a similar observation with regard to the Kennedy advertisement showing
Nixon nodding his head. "Had Kennedy proclaimed at the moment before or after the edited
insert, 'Nixon agrees with me' he would have been lying. Instead the ad showed Nixon
seemingly agreeing and thus made the same argument more forcefully." Jamieson, supra note
21, at 16.
41. M. KER.N, supra note 2, at 102.
42. Id.
43. In one advertisement of this type, a granddaughter approaches her grandfather and
proudly tells him she will be voting for the first time. The grandfather gently urges her to
vote Republican because the Democrats will raise taxes. Id. at 103.
44. One particularly famous Jesse Helms advertisement ran in the 1990 Senate campaign
against challenger Harvey Gant shows white hands crumpling a rejection letter, while an
offscreen announcer says that the job went to a minority to fill a quota. See Kinsley, What's
Really Fair, Tita, Nov. 19, 1990, at 124; Race Baiting Wins Again: Helms Wins a Fourth
Term by Exploiting White Anxieties, Tam, Nov. 19, 1990, at 43.
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an explicit statement about a campaign issue, but the visual images implicitly
appeal to a prejudice or predisposition. Because the latter appeal is implicit,
the advertisement may appeal to those who share the prejudice or predis-
position without alienating those who do not.4
3. Brevity of Political Advertisements
A final hallmark of contemporary advertisements is their brevity-the
average spot is only thirty seconds long, or less." Several factors have
contributed to this phenomenon including the high cost of advertising,47 the
perception that shorter advertisements are more effective at reaching the
audience necessary to win an election, 4" and the unwillingness of broadcasters
to air longer advertisements. 4 Whatever the reason, however, policy choices
and complex issues generally cannot be explained in thirty seconds. As
Jamieson observes,
Although thirty and sixty second spots can capsulize a candidate's
position on central issues they lack the time needed to specify the
evidence and warrants that lead to that position. What spots do best is
telegraph to the electorate the candidate's agreement or disagreement
with positions voters already embrace. What they cannot do well is
educate the electorate about the desirability of one position over the
other or familiarize the electorate with the subtleties of complex matters
such as the relationship between the budget deficit and interest rates.
Doing either requires longer than sixty seconds. 0
The short spot also encourages advertisers to make emotional rather than
rational appeals and to distort the truth. Advertiser Charles Guggenheim
notes,
Ask any seasoned media adviser and he will tell you what he can do
best given 30 seconds. Create doubt. Build fear. Exploit anxiety. Hit
and run. The 30- and 60- second commercials are ready-made for the
45. See M. KERN, supra note 2, at 144 (describing how Senator Jesse Helms uses this tactic
in his campaigns).
46. Id. at 4. (Thirty-second advertisement has been dominant since 1976.); see also E.
DIAMOND & S. BATEs, supra note 2, at 381-83; Jamieson, supra note 21, at 13.
47. The rising cost of television advertising encourages candidates to use their resources
sparingly. See M. KERN, supra note 2, at 4 (Cost of airing advertisements longer than thirty
seconds is prohibitive below the presidential level.).
48. Viewers are more likely to stay with shorter spots of 30 to 60 seconds. Longer spots
tend to preach to the converted and lose a significant portion of the initial viewing audience.
E. DIAMOND & S. BATES, supra note 2, at 382.
49. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 53 (statement of Charles Guggenheim, President,
Guggenheim Productions, Inc.); see also CBS v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367, 370-73 (1981) (noting
difficulty of obtaining longer advertising during prime time).
50. Jamieson, supra note 21, at 13; see also M. KERN, supra note 2, at 4 (noting difficulty
of explaining complex ideas in ads).
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innuendo and half-truth. Because of their brevity, the audience forgives
their failure to qualify, to explain, to defend.5'
Thus, the brevity of spots impedes their ability to foster meaningful debate
on prospective policy choices.
C. Problems Posed by Political Advertising
The foregoing analysis indicates that the current nature of political
advertising should be of serious concern. Political advertisements simply do
not contain detailed discussion of prospective policy choices. This impedes
democratic self-government. If voters cannot discern from a campaign how
a candidate intends to govern or what the range of policy choices facing
the government is, their ability to participate in government by voting is
diminished. 52 Also of concern is the extent to which advertisers can and do
exploit the medium to make advertisements that are deceptive, covertly
appeal to prejudices, or do nothing more than identify a candidate with
consensually held values. These problems not only suggest that the electorate
may not get the information it needs to govern from political ads, but also
that the electorate may be distracted by the information it does receive."
If the proper test for any mode of political communication is its ability to
"enable and constrain politicians to address the public in as intelligible and
illuminating terms as possible ... [so that] people [can] make choices in
accord with the politics they wish[] to support,"5 4 political advertising has
probably failed.
One must be careful not to romanticize the past in criticizing the present
state of affairs. The origins of the contemporary political commercial can
be found in the hand-carried transparencies of the mid-to-late 1800s, which
relied on bald assertion and mindless association at least as much as
51. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 54 (prepared statement of Charles Guggenheim,
President, Guggenheim Productions, Inc.).
52. Joslyn, supra note 10, at 182-83 ("[T]elevised political advertising interferes with seeing
elections as a choice between alternative policy futures and prevents election outcomes from
representing the electorate's 'mandate' for a particular program of governmental action.").
53. Joslyn sums up the problem as follows:
The world of televised, campaign commercials is much more likely to delimit
citizen understanding to perceptions of candidate personas and the recognition
of cultural icons and values than to an apreciation [sic] of policy alternatives;
much more likely to restrict elections to choices between competing images of
candidate personalities, unbalanced perceptions of incumbent and challenger
records, or a choice between participation or nonparticipation than to a choice
between competing programs of governmental action or political belief; and much
more likely to reveal a truncated message-as-sent by the electorate than a message
rich with preference or guidance for a future course of governmental action.
Id. at 183.
54. Blumler, Political Communication: Democratic Theory and Broadcast Practice, 3 MAss
COMM. REv. YEARBOOK 621, 633-34 (1982).
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contemporary advertisements. 5 In the past, however, banners and slogans
were "intended to draw people to the meeting where they could hear the
candidate or his or her surrogate speak about the issues and how they will
deal with them"; today "ads alone ... are becoming the campaign for
many increasingly uninvolved voters."' 1 The result can be that elections
become less of a choice between contrasting programs than a "competition
between media advisers. " 57 As two experts note,
the prevalence of high-gloss, high-tech media campaigns may be trivi-
alizing electoral politics.... When the polispots become just one more
entertainment to watch, it will become harder and harder for the audience
to regard them as important .... The result may be a distancing
between candidate and citizen; voting may become just one more activity
being commended to us by television purveyors of goods and services.
We watch the free show, but we don't necessarily get involved; we are
passively entertained.s8
The consequences for democracy may be severe indeed.
Obviously, how much damage is done to our political system by the lack
of substantive political discussion in political advertising depends on one's
view of the proper function of elections in a democratic society. If the
purpose of elections is to make substantive policy choices, as many political
scientists argue, 59 the lack of substantive discussion in political advertise-
ments obviously undermines that purpose. Political scientists also suggest,
however, that elections are valuable if leaders are selected on the basis of
intangible, personal attributes, a purpose that image-oriented advertising
furthers. 0 The very existence of this debate, however, demonstrates that
both functions are important. A wise choice by the electorate almost
certainly requires both a rational evaluation of a candidate's proposals and
a less articulatable judgment of the character of that candidate. One,
therefore, need not think that issue-oriented, rational political advertisements
are superior to image-oriented advertisements to be concerned about the
current state of political advertising. Substantive discussion of prospective
policy choices should at least be an important factor in our choice of
leaders. To the extent that current advertising does not stimulate this
discussion, political debate is impoverished.
55. Jamieson, supra note 21, at 3-7; see also M. KERN, supra note 2, at 212 ("[A]dvertising
[for candidates] has always been 'catchy' and sloganistic.").
56. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 212.
57. Clean Campaign Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1310 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12, 14 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearings] (statement of Curtis Gans, Director,
Committee for the Study of the American Electorate).
58. E. DiAMoND & S. BATES, supra note 2, at 386.
59. Joslyn, supra note 10, at 142, 183.
60. See id.
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D. The Inadequacy of Existing Mechanisms for Improving
the Quality of Political Debate During Election Campaigns
1. Regulating False Statements in Political Advertising
The current regulatory framework for political advertising fails to address
the previously mentioned problems because it is limited almost exclusively
to regulating false speech.6' A candidate is liable for damages if she defames
another candidate. 62 In addition, some states and the federal government
provide criminal sanctions for making false statements in political adver-
tisements. 63 Courts rarely will grant injunctive relief to prevent a fraud from
being perpetrated on voters unless there exists explicit statutory authority
for the injunction.64 However, a prohibition on false statements in political
advertising does not necessarily ensure that the advertisements will be more
informative or constructive in generating political debate. Furthermore, in
practice, prohibitions on false statements are construed so narrowly and
applied so belatedly that the effect on political advertising is minimal.
Courts severely restrict prohibitions on falsity in order to give adequate
breathing space to political speech. Under the New York Times v. Sullivan6 1
standard, only intentionally or recklessly false statements of fact about a
political candidate can be regulated.6 Furthermore, courts generally require
61. See Albert, supra note 17, at 57; Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 1111, 1273-86 (1975); House, Prior Restraints on Campaign Speech in California, 14 W.
ST. U. L. REv. 409 (1987); Neel, Note, Campaign Hyperbole: The Advisability of Legislating
False Statements Out of Politics, 2 J.L. & POL. 405 (1985); Winsbro, supra note 30.
62. Albert, supra note 17, at 41-44. For representative cases in which candidates have sued
for defamation by false statements in political ads, see id. at 45-49.
63. Neel, supra note 61, at 406 n.5 (Seventeen states prohibit the use of false statements
in political campaigns.); 2 U.S.C. § 441h (1988) (Candidate for federal office prohibited from
fraudulently misrepresenting herself as member of political party.). There is no reported
decision of a prosecution brought under this section.
64. Compare Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910
(1974) (complaint that winner of primary election had been a sham candidate who planned to
withdraw after winning so that party bosses could pick candidate stated federal cause of action)
and Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (state Democratic-affliated party-
named the Representation for Every Person party-enjoined from campaigning with the slogan
"Vote REP" in Republican areas, where there was evidence such campaigning would deceive
voters) with Rudisill v. Flynn, 619 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1980) (allegations that referendum was
backed by people who misrepresented its cost, the need for the project, and their financial
interest in it not sufficient to create federal cause of action arising out of interference with
fundamental right to vote).
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. Id. at 279-80; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("IT]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds
with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic,
social or political change is to be effected."); see also Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). A candidate for public office is a public figure
for first amendment purposes. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971).
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that statements about a political candidate be unambiguously false before
ordering reliefA7 This standard is practically impossible to meet. Although
outright false statements are sometimes made in spots, it is far more common
for advertisements to make statements or leave impressions that are open
to different interpretations, some true and others false. 68
The result is that prohibiting false speech does not affect most advertise-
ments. Even when it does, any relief usually comes long after the election,
when the damage already has been done to the electoral process. 69 At this
point, courts are reluctant to interfere in the electoral process by voiding
an election 70 and may refuse to do so even where a material violation of
the statute has occurred. 7' These problems might be partially remedied by
giving courts the power to order candidates to retract false statements, even
for negligent misrepresentations, because the chilling effect from retraction
would be less than that from damages.7 2 However, the scope of even this
expanded regulation probably would be narrow as long as only unambigu-
ously false statements were prohibited.
2. Press Monitoring of Election Advertisements
It is also unlikely that increased monitoring of political advertising by
the print press, as some have advocated, 73 can significantly improve the
quality of political debate during elections. The press can improve the
quality of campaigns somewhat by providing information to voters. After
the 1988 campaign, for example, critics charged that the press failed to
expose inaccuracies and deceptions in television advertisements.7 4 In re-
sponse, the print media began monitoring advertising more closely and
challenging advertisers to back up the statements made in them.75 The
increased monitoring made some advertisers more scrupulous about the
content of their advertisements.7 6 As previously discussed, however, even a
67. Mosee v. Clark, 253 Or. 83, 85, 453 P.2d 176, 178 (1969); Neel, supra note 61, at
413-14.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40; Daley, supra note 8.
69. See Winsbro, supra note 30, at 875-76.
70. Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981); Mosee, 253 Or. at 88, 453 P.2d
at 178; Neel, supra note 61, at 411.
71. See In re Ryan, 303 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. 1981).
72. L. TIME, AmERicAN CoNsTrruTIONAL LAw §§ 13-26 (2d ed. 1988). But see Developments
in the Law-Elections, supra note 61, at 1283 (Retraction remedy would impermissibly chill
campaign speech.).
73. See Shogan & Rosenthiel, supra note 8.
74. See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 23.
75. Rosenberg, Newspapers Watch What People Watch in the Campaign, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1990, at D3, col. 1; Rosenthiel, Policing Political TV Ads, L.A. Times, Oct. 4, 1990,
at Al, col. 1. The print media did this by publishing "truth boxes" that analyzed individual
candidate commercials for accuracy.
76. Rosenthiel, supra note 75.
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meticulously accurate advertisement may not promote informed and rational
discussion of campaign issues. To date, the press has not succeeded in
making advertising campaigns more substantive. It seems unduly optimistic,
if not naive, to think that the press will succeed where it has failed before.
Furthermore, any reliance on the vigilance of the press assumes that
voters are paying attention to it. The most detailed discussion of election
issues is likely to be in newspapers, with less detailed information in the
network news. Many viewers who view political advertisements on television
do not generally read the newspaper or watch the network news. 77 Thus,
even if the press successfully counteracts the distortions and evasions in a
political advertisement, the information provided may not reach many of
those who viewed the advertisement.
3. Voluntary Compliance with Election Codes
Proposals to increase voluntary compliance with fair campaign codes78
are also unlikely to improve the content of political advertisements. Present
and past codes, including that of the American Association of Political
Broadcasters, have prohibited many of the campaign practices that have
drawn the most criticism, including making deceptive and misleading ad-
vertisements, appealing to racism and other prejudices, and exploiting or
creating unfounded fears and doubts about a candidate. 79
The most significant enforcement scheme for such a code was that of the
Fair Campaign Practices Committee (FCPC), a nonpartisan group formed
in the 1950s in response to the demagogic attacks characteristic of the
McCarthy era. The FCPC monitored election advertising, and when it
determined that a candidate had violated the code, it pressured the candidate
to withdraw or alter the advertisement in question. If the candidate refused,
the FCPC threatened to publish its findings in the media. The FCPC
ultimately proved ineffective because of lack of funding and lack of en-
forcement power.80
The experience of the FCPC illustrates the problems inherent in a vol-
untary compliance system. It is possible that a better funded and more
77. See Choi & Becker, Media Use, Issue/Image Discriminations and Voting, 14 Comm.
REs. 267, 285 (1980) (Newspapers provide more informative coverage of campaigns than
television news, but persons who rely on television for information do not generally read
newspapers.); T. PAT=ERSON & R. McCLuRE, supra note 6, at 25 (Voters who were most
influenced by political advertisements did not follow campaign in news media.).
78. Tucker & Heller, Putting Ethics Into Practice, CAMPAIGNS & ELEcTONS, Mar.-Apr.
1987, at 42; Hall, Note, When Political Campaigns Turn to Slime: Establishing a Virginia
Fair Campaign Practices Committee, 7 J.L. & POL. 353 (1991).
79. Tucker & Heller, supra note 78, at 44-45; Hall, supra note 78, at 367 n.84.
80. M. PFAU & H. KENSKI, supra note 2, at 65; Tucker & Heller, supra note 78, at 44-
45; Hail, supra note 78, at 366-68.
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effective voluntary compliance system could be established. However, the
simple fact is that advertising uses the techniques it does because they work.
It seems unlikely that candidates would voluntarily abandon such techniques
as long as they are effective.
In sum, there already exists a variety of mechanisms to police the content
of political advertisements. Some of these schemes could be improved, and
certainly none should be abandoned. It is unlikely, however, that regulation
of false statements, increased press scrutiny of political advertising, or the
promulgation of voluntary codes will, by themselves, make political adver-
tisements significantly more informative or substantive.
E. Proposals to Regulate Political Advertisements
A number of more comprehensive proposals to regulate political adver-
tising have emerged. One set of proposals aims to restrict the type of
advertising that a candidate can air. For example, one proposal-known as
the Clean Campaign Act-would require that the candidate appear in any
negative advertisement attacking another candidate. 81 Some acknowledge
that its purpose is to deter negative advertising, 82 while others emphasize
that its only purpose is to make candidates accountable for the advertise-
ments that they run.83 The theory is that candidates will be less likely to
engage in unfair, misleading, or manipulative advertising if they must make
the attack personally.
A second proposal of this type would require that all advertising conform
to a talking-heads format, in which the candidate addresses the camera
without the benefit of additional images or other visual or aural enhance-
ments.84 Other proposals add or substitute a requirement that the advertise-
ment be of a minimum length.85 Studies have shown that the talking-heads
advertisement is most often used to convey a candidate's position on a
81. S. 999, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. Rac. 55384 (daily ed. May 16, 1989).
If any legally qualified candidate for any Federal elective office (or an authorized
committee of any such candidate) who utilizes rights of access and conditions of
access under the provisions of this Act uses a broadcasting station to refer,
directly or indirectly, to another legally qualified candidate for that office, such
reference shall be made in person by such legally qualified candidate.
Id. The Clean Campaign Act has been the subject of two legislative hearings. See 1989
Hearings, supra note 9; 1985 Hearings, supra note 57.
82. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Senator Hollings); see also id. at
3-4 (statement of Senator Pressler) (supporting legislation and expressing concern about "level
of negative campaigning").
83. Id. at 3 (statement of Senator Danforth).
84. 1985 Hearings, supra note 57, at 30 (statement of Curtis Gans, Director, Committee
for the Study of the American Electorate); Gans, How Those Negatives Developed, Wash.
Post, Feb. 12, 1989, at C2, col. 1.
85. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 54 (statement of Charles E. Guggenheim, President,
Guggenheim Productions, Inc.) (Ads should be required to be two minutes or longer.).
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particular issue.16 The format was widely used in 1960.87 Now, however,
"clear, issue-oriented" talking heads are rare."s Instead, when a candidate
is featured addressing the camera, the advertisement usually carries other
musical or visual enhancements so that the advertisement primarily conveys
an image without addressing an issue.8 9
Proponents argue that a talking-heads restriction would generate more
issue-oriented advertising because the format would prevent the candidate
from making advertising that did anything else. 90 In addition, proponents
note that such a proposal would eliminate the high-production advertising
that seems most capable of distorting issues and appealing to fears, preju-
dices, and emotions.9 1 Finally, some suggest that because such advertising
will be boring politicians will spend less money on advertisements and spend
more on reaching the people directly. 92
A second set of proposals attempts to generate new information and types
of advertising for voters but otherwise leaves the candidates free to use
their campaign funds to run the kind of advertising that they desire. For
example, some policy makers and experts advocate strengthened disclosure
and identification requirements. For advertisements sponsored by indepen-
dent groups, some have proposed disclosure requirements as rigorous as a
continuous printed disclaimer stating that the advertisement is not authorized
by a candidate and naming the group responsible for it.91 For advertisements
86. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 48-49; Shyles, The Relationship of Images, Issues and
Presentational Methods in Televised Spot Advertisements for 1980's American Presidential
Primaries, 28 J. BRoADCASnTNG 405, 416 (1984); Shyles, The Televised Political Spot Adver-
tisement, in NEw PERsPEcTIES, supra note 2, at 126; Devlin, supra note 3, at 26.
87. Devlin, supra note 3, at 25-26, 36-38. A Nixon talking-head advertisement pledged to
improve civil rights and explained why it was necessary to do so. A Kennedy talking-head ad
outlined and advocated a proposal to provide medicare for the elderly.
88. M. Knma, supra note 2, at 94.
89. Id. An example is a 1988 Bush advertisement that opens with Bush's granddaughter
running toward him. Bush then looks into the camera and says: "I want a kinder and gentler
nation. I hear the quiet people others don't: the ones who raise the families, pay the taxes."
The camera cuts to Bush raising granddaughter. Then "Experienced Leadership For America's
Future" is superimposed on the screen. Diamond & Matin, supra note 3, at 384.
90. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 33-37 (statement of Curtis Gans, Director, Committee
for the Study of the American Electorate); 1985 Hearings, supra note 57, at 30-31 (statement
of Curtis Gans).
91. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 33-37 (statement of Curtis Gans).
92. E. DIAMoND & S. BAThs, supra note 2, at 384.
93. S. 3, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNO. REc. 473, 477 (1991) (Television advertisements
sponsored by independent groups must contain communications covering at least 25% of the
screen running for the duration of the advertisement stating that the advertisement is not
authorized by the candidate and naming the sponsoring organization.); H.R. 5400, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., 136 CoNG. Rac. 6877 (1990) (All advertisements sponsored by independent groups
must contain a printed disclaimer running continuously during the advertisement of sufficient
size to be readable stating "Paid for by _. Not authorized by any candidate.").
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sponsored by candidates, a brief appearance by the candidate stating that
she approved the advertisement would be required. 94
A second proposal of this type would provide candidates with free
advertising, either through broadcast vouchers or free air time, but require
that the advertisements be in a talking-heads format and be of a minimum
length suitable to the development of issues.9 s The most ambitious of these
proposals, advocated by political reporter Paul Taylor, would provide
candidates with five minutes of free air time on alternating nights during
the last four nights of the campaign. The candidate would have to appear
personally throughout the duration of the spot.9 6 Other proposals have been
more modest. Some propose free air time with the sole condition that the
candidate run longer advertisements.Y Others propose free air time alone,
without restrictions as to length or format.98 Advocates of subsidizing
advertising argue that it would add new and better advertising to the political
marketplace while relaxing the pressure on candidates to raise a large amount
of money in order to conduct a campaign.Y Virtually every other major
industrialized democracy bans paid political advertising but provides free
air time to its political parties during elections.2°
The different assumptions behind these two types of proposals should
not be overlooked. The first set of proposals assumes that the talking-heads
format is in every way superior to the short image-oriented advertisements
94. H.R. 5400, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. Rac. 6851 (1990) (Ads sponsored by
candidates must contain identifiable image of candidate for at least four seconds and take up
at least one-third of screen, with printed disclaimer stating that the candidate takes full
responsibility for the ad.); S. 3, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 477 (1991) (Ad
sponsored by candidate must contain full screen appearance of candidate stating "I am a
candidate for (office the candidate is seeking) and I have approved the contents of this
broadcast."); S. 521, CAMPAIGN ADvERTiswaG AND DiscLosuaE ACT OF 1991, S. Rep. No. 59,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Ad sponsored by candidate must contain picture of candidate
occupying at least 40% of screen and candidate must state "I, -, a candidate for -,
have approved of this ad.").
95. P. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 268; Talking Heads: Reforming Campaign Finance and
Content, Naw REaPunuc, Aug. 20, 1990, at 7.
96. P. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 268.
97. S. 3, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. 478 (1991) and S. 7, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., 137 CONG. Rac. 520 (1991) both provide for free advertising to candidates in blocks of
one to five minutes. CENTER FOR RESPONSrVE PoLrnIcs, BEYOND THE 30-SEcoND SPOT: EN-
HANCING THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN CONGRESSiONAL CAMPAiNS 65-68 (1988) (Candidates should
receive free air time in five-minute blocks.).
98. L. SABATO, supra note 3, at 25-26.
99. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 53-57 (statement of Charles E. Guggenheim, President,
Guggenheim Productions, Inc.); 1985 Hearings, supra note 57, at 53-54 (statement of Charles
E. Guggenheim); E. DIAMoND & S. BATES, supra note 2, at 387; L. SABATO, supra note 3, at
25; Matheson, Federal Legislation to Elevate and Enlighten Political Debate: A Letter and
Report to the 102d Congress About Constitutional Policy, 7 J.L. & POL. 73, 78 (1990).
100. L. SABATO, supra note 3, at 30-31; see also Paw, Political Broadcasting Access in the
United States and Great Britain, 10 Com. & LAW, Aug. 1988, at 33, 39-46 (describing British
system).
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that now dominate the airwaves and that the latter should therefore be
banned or strongly discouraged. By contrast, the second set of proposals
does not necessarily assume that the issue-oriented talking-heads format is
superior to image-oriented format. Rather, these proposals merely posit that
certain kinds of information that is of value to voters-information about
the source of an advertisement and substantive discussion of policy choices-
is not being provided by paid advertising and that such information should
be added to the political marketplace. This Article takes the position that
only this second approach is constitutional.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR REGULATING POLITICAL ADVERTISING
Proposals to alter the format of political advertising present the novel
constitutional question of whether the government can regulate the form of
political speech in order to make it more conducive to enlightened debate
and the exchange of information and ideas.' °' Because of our strong
commitment to free speech, any restriction on the content of expression is
suspect. A close analysis of free speech principles, however, reveals a strong
interest in regulating the form of political advertising to enable citizens to
obtain the information they require to govern themselves. Therefore, a
regulation cannot be dismissed as invalid simply because it abridges the
individual right of a speaker to express herself in any manner that she
chooses. Neither, however, should a regulation be upheld merely because it
is asserted that it will advance free speech values. A close analysis reveals
that format restrictions present a danger of unduly restricting the amount
and communicative impact of speech. A proposed restriction must, there-
fore, be analyzed in light of the degree to which it presents recognized
dangers to free expression. A regulation that minimizes such dangers and
advances the government's strong interest in enhancing political debate
should be held constitutional.
A. Supreme Court Precedent and Political Advertising
The relatively small body of case law on regulating campaign advertising
sheds little light on the boundaries for permissible regulation of campaign
advertising. In Brown v. Hartlage, '02 the Supreme Court reversed a Kentucky
Court of Appeals decision that had voided an election because the winning
101. The extent to which the government may regulate the form of political advertising has
only recently begun to be addressed by commentators. See Arbogast, Political Campaign
Advertising and the First Amendment: A Structural-Functional Analysis of Proposed Reform,
23 AKRON L. REv. 209 (1989); Matheson, supra note 99; Winsbro, supra note 30.
102. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
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candidate had promised during the campaign to reduce his salary if elected.
The Court rejected three arguments brought before it. First, it was argued
that the candidate's promise to reduce his salary was tantamount to offering
a bribe to voters.103 The Court acknowledged that the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process and could prohibit
buying votes.'°4 The candidate's promise, however, merely expressed how
he intended to exercise the powers of his office if elected. This was the
kind of information that campaigning was meant to provide, the Court
held, and the state had no interest in prohibiting it.10s
The Court also rejected the argument that the interest in providing
adequate salaries for public service, so that the rich and poor alike would
have an incentive to run for elected office, justified a ban on discussing
public salaries during campaigns.'06 Whether public salaries would be set
high enough so that the less well-off would be able to afford to run, the
Court said, was a decision to be made by the people. Protecting voters
from making a bad choice by banning public discussion of an issue was
"contrary to the fundamental premises underlying the First Amendment as
the guardian of our democracy."' 07
Third, it was argued that because the salary that the candidate had
promised to reduce was set by law the candidate's promise was false and
subject to legitimate sanctions. 08 The Court held that voiding the election,
with its consequent chill of political speech during elections, was an inap-
propriate remedy in this case, regardless of whether the statement was
false.'°9 There was no showing that the candidate had made the false
statement knowingly or recklessly. 0 Furthermore, the candidate had publicly
retracted his pledge a few days after making it and promised instead to
work to change state law."'
In Mills v. Alabama,12 the Court reversed the conviction of a newspaper
editor who had been prosecuted for publishing an editorial on election day
urging voters to support a council system. The editor was prosecuted under
a statute that prohibited electioneering on the day of election." 3 The Court
invalidated the statute, holding that it did not advance the asserted interests
in preventing voters from being confused by last-minute charges. Instead,
103. Id. at 57. The state bribery statute had previously been interpreted to prohibit a
candidate from promising to lower a salary that was fixed by law. Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 55.
105. Id. at 57-58.
106. Id. at 59-60.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 61-62.
110. Id. at 61.
111. Id. at 48-49.
112. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
113. Id. at 216.
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the statute left people free to hurl charges up until the day before the
election but then criminalized making an effective response. 14
In Schwartz v. Postel, 5 the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge
court ruling that had invalidated key provisions of the New York Fair
Campaign Code." 6 The district court held that the prohibition on false
statements unconstitutionally chilled protected speech because it permitted
the state elections board to restrain publication of campaign speech without
clear and convincing proof that the false statements were made intentionally
or with reckless disregard of their truth." 7 The statute also unconstitutionally
prohibited attacks on a candidate based on race, sex, religion, or ethnic
grounds. The court held that the state could not sweepingly prohibit the
discussion of these factors that many in the electorate might find relevant."'
Not surprisingly, these cases demonstrate that the government cannot
prohibit the discussion of certain subjects or ideas. However, the holdings
do not answer the more difficult question of how far the government can
go in regulating the form of political advertising so as to improve the level
and diversity of public debate. A more comprehensive analysis is therefore
needed to determine whether a format restriction is consistent with free
speech.
B. The Government's Interest in Informed Political Debate
1. The Relationship of the Government's Interest
in Informed Debate to Free Expression
The government has a strong interest in ensuring that political debate
during elections be informed, and this interest inheres in the very concept
of free expression." 9 Free expression requires that debate on public affairs
be "robust, uninhibited and wide-open"1 20 precisely so that the people can
freely discuss governmental affairs and choose how they want to be gov-
114. Id. at 220.
115. 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
116. Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
117. Id. at 100.
118. Id. at 94.
119. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam) ("In a republic where the
people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates
for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the
course that we follow as a nation."); see Gardner, Note, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral
Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 892 (1984) (First
amendment doctrine should recognize the government interest in ensuring that elections reflect
the true reasoned and informed choice of the people.); Matheson, supra note 99, at 87-90.
120. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 251, 270 (1963).
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erned. 2 1 An election is the one time when discussion is the most focused
and when the opportunity for individual participation by the largest segment
of the public is the greatest. Thus, when the Court declares that the first
amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office,"' 2 it does little more than state
a truism. The more interesting questions are what free expression requires
and how it can best be achieved.
One theory is that free speech is more concerned with fostering self-
government than with protecting the autonomy of individual speakers. 2'
Under this theory, free expression cannot be defined solely by reference to
the freedom of individual speakers to express themselves. It also requires
an inquiry into the nature of the resulting exchange of information and
ideas that takes place.12 Clearly, the Court has not always followed this
principle. In Buckley v. Valeo-5 and First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti126 for example, the Court struck down restrictions on campaign
expenditures by individuals, groups, and corporations despite arguments
that such restrictions were justified because they prevented wealthy indivi-
duals and groups from dominating public debate. 127 In other instances,
however, the Court has tolerated infringements on autonomy because such
infringements secure a better climate for free expression. 28 Thus, the prin-
ciple has at least some vitality.
121. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.");
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956) (The first amendment was "fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.").
122. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971); see also Brown, 456 U.S.
at 53 ("The free exchange of ideas provides special vitality to the process traditionally at the
heart of American constitutional democracy-the political campaign.").
123. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1409-10 (1986); Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. Rv. 191; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 245.
124. See A. ManaasoiN, PoLIcIAL FREEDOM 26-27 (1965); Fiss, supra note 123, at 1410
(Free speech permits the government to guarantee rich public debate, even at the expense of
the autonomy of individual speakers.).
125. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
126. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
127. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23 (striking limits on campaign expenditures by candidates
and independent groups); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92 (striking state restrictions on the use of
corporate expenditures to influence the outcome of a public referendum).
128. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) (upholding ban
on corporate expenditures for campaign activities, except from a segregated fund, even though
such a ban burdens the expressive rights of corporations); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (upholding
contribution limitations even though they restrict the manner in which citizens may exercise
their rights of association); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
fairness doctrine and holding that rights of listeners to balanced presentation of issues
outweighed interests of broadcasters in complete editorial control over programming).
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Proposals to regulate the format of political advertising can be justified
by reference to the implicit corollary of this principle: namely, that when
speech does not contribute to or when it detracts from self-government, it
can be regulated. Because certain formats for political advertising are better
at providing the information and the debate necessary for self-government,
regulations to require or provide an incentive for the use Qf such formats
are arguably consistent with free expression.
2. The Limited Interest in Autonomy
In the context of election advertising, the extent to which a format
restriction impinges on the autonomy of an individual or a candidate to
speak in the manner that she wants is irrelevant to assessing whether a
restriction infringes on free speech. Whether the first amendment is seen as
protecting primarily the right of society to govern itself' 29 or the right of
individuals to self-realization, 30 achieving either will sometimes require
access to information. To the extent that format restrictions enhance access
to information for individuals and society to make important choices, it
advances first amendment goals.
Furthermore, whatever interests an individual has in self-expression take
on a different quality when the individual is participating in a governmental
process. A witness to a crime may be subpoenaed to testify against her
will. "' A trial attorney may not state his personal opinion regarding matters
at issue in the trial.3 2 An agency official may be compelled to release
information pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. 3a All of
these situations infringe on an individual's freedom to speak or not to
speak. Yet, no one would argue that these restrictions are unconstitutional.
The implicit assumption is that the individuals are primarily functionaries
in a governmental system for obtaining information in an orderly manner.
At times, their personal interests may be so implicated that it becomes more
129. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948).
130. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (One of the interests served by
the first amendment is individual self-fulfillment.); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (Free speech ultimately serves only one value, individual self-
realization.).
131. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
132. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1983) (An attorney may not
"state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused."); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(c)(3) (1980). The Court has recently indicated that
the attorney's role as an officer of the court justifies less stringent first amendment protection
from state regulation of public comment on a case than that afforded other individuals and
the press. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
133. See L. TRIBE, supra note 72, §§ 12-14.
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important than their role in a governmental function. 3 4 Otherwise, the
interest in preserving the viability of a governmental process justifies what
would otherwise be undue restrictions on an individual's autonomy.
Candidates and others who participate in an election have a right to
express themselves, but they do not have a right to win or to have their
views prevail. That is a choice that the electorate must make. Restrictions
on the autonomy of candidates and participants may be necessary to ensure
that the process is as efficient as possible.
3. The Free Marketplace of Ideas and Format Restrictions
The use of format restrictions to improve the level of public debate during
elections is not inconsistent with the celebrated "marketplace-of-ideas"
metaphor. 35 This metaphor is arguably the closest that the Court has come
to embracing a coherent theory of the first amendment. 36 The application
of the metaphor to elections is fairly straightforward. Essentially the hy-
pothesis is that if people have unfettered access to the information and
ideas put out by candidates they will be more likely to make the choice
that is most consistent with how they want society to be.
The problem is that most election campaigns are not, to borrow from
Milton, a "free and open encounter" between competing ideas and pro-
grams. 3 7 Instead, candidates generally struggle to avoid revealing too many
specifics of how they intend to govern. In doing this, they may distort the
truth, appeal to prejudices and fears, and attempt to link themselves to
vague consensually held values. The marketplace metaphor assumes that
people will be able to use their rational capacities to eliminate these
distortions and "find the core of relevant information or argument."' 38 This
assumption is at best questionable, even on a theoretical level. Human
psychology is such that irrational and irrelevant factors often influence a
person's choice and actions, even if subconsciously. 3 9 Furthermore, studies
Ity political scientists indicate that voters too often base their decisions on
inadequate information or nonrational factors unrelated to a candidate's
fitness for office.Y'°
134. Such a situation could occur when answering a question would subject a witness to
criminal prosecution.
135. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
964, 968 (1978).
137. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 59 (1965) ("Let [truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever
knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?").
138. Baker, supra note 136, at 976.
139. See id.
140. Gardner, supra note 119, at 892, 899-900.
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
These problems indicate that a blind-faith belief that unregulated adver-
tising will provide the information necessary for political voters is actually
inconsistent with the ideal of a marketplace of ideas. On its own terms, the
theory assumes a marketplace of ideas, not one of distortions and evasions.
If format restrictions can help ensure that political debate becomes more
of a free and open struggle between competing ideas, programs, and policies,
they make elections more consistent with the marketplace of ideas model.
C. A Case Study-Union Certification Elections
One area where restrictions on the form of speech are enforced in order
to ensure a fairer election is in union certification elections to choose a
collective bargaining representative. Under the doctrine first articulated in
Sewell Mfg., 141 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) will void an
election if either the union or management uses campaign propaganda
"which can have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of voters
in the election."' 142 Once it is shown that the statement was made, the
burden shifts to the party who employed the propaganda to show that the
statement was truthful, germane, and within "reasoned bounds."'1 43 The
Board and the courts have applied this standard to void or further investigate
elections in a variety of circumstances, including appeals to biases against
African-Americans' 44 and Japanese, 14s religious hatred, 1' and inflammatory
statements with no explicit racial or religious bias. 47
141. 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
142. Id. at 71. This doctrine has generated a considerable degree of academic commentary.
See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964); Pollitt, The National Labor Relations
Board and Racial Hate Propaganda in Union Organization Drives, 17 STAN. L. REv. 373
(1965); Motley, Note, Labor Representation Elections and the Constitutional Right to Campaign
Vigorously, 23 S.C.L. REv. 400 (1971); Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race
and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963); Note, Restrictions on
the Employer's Right of Free Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargaining,
63 Nw. U.L. REv. 40 (1968).
143. Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 72.
144. Id. (Management linked a union to integrationist efforts and distributed picture showing
a white union official dancing with African-American woman.).
145. YKK (USA) Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 82, 84 (1984) (Union employees wore shirts and work
rags printed with the phrases "Remember Pearl Harbor," "Japs Go Home," "Japs Speak
With Forked Tongue," and "Slant Eyes.").
146. NLRB v. Katz, 701 F.2d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pro-union protest addressed workers
with phrases such as "Nazis marched in Skokie to keep the Blacks out."); NLRB v. Silverman's
Men's Wear, Inc., 656 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1981) (Union official referred to company executive
as a "stingy Jew.").
147. Schneider Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 375, 377, 379-80 (4th Cir. 1968) (A union
compared a company president to Hitler.).
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In applying this standard, the Board first examines whether the statement
is relevant to an issue germane to the election." 48 Statements with racial
overtones are tolerated as long as they are true and "pertain to a subject
concerning which employees are entitled to have knowledge."'' 49 These
include information relating to the racial policies of the union,15 0 appeals
to economic self-interest,151 and appeals to racial solidarity among tradi-
tionally oppressed minority groups.1 52
Even if a statement is relevant, however, the Board may void an election
if an idea was expressed in a gratuitously inflammatory manner. Thus, in
Katz the Court noted that while "the priest's comment regarding the wealth
of Jewish people, as juxtaposed to the poverty of the employees, might be
relevant to the campaign, the point could have been made without ... a
racial slur."' 53 Similarly, in condemning a union leader's reference to an
executive as a "stingy Jew" in Silverman's, the Third Circuit commented:
"If the Union leader had desired to stress the executive's parsimony, he
could have referred to 'stingy Silverman' or the 'stingy vice-president.'
Instead, he allegedly resorted to a disreputable stratagem of bigots.'
5 4
Indeed in Sewell and Allen-Morrison 5 decided on the same day, the
contrasting forms used to convey the same essential image led to different
outcomes. In both cases, management had urged the defeat of the union by
linking it to integrationist policies and activists. Moreover, in both cases, the
Board acknowledged a potential that the strategy would appeal to racist and
prosegregation sentiments among the largely white work force. 5 6 Yet in Allen-
Morrison, management's primary mode of expression was a "5 "2 page
single-spaced letter."'17 By contrast, in Sewell, it was the distribution of
photographs of black and white men and women dancing together. 5 Ana-
lyzing the two communications, the court concluded that the former had a
148. See, e.g., id. and YKK, 269 N.L.R.B. at 84 (both noting the irrelevancy of the
inflammatory statements).
149. Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 71.
150. Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962) (finding appropriate "temperate"
letter from management of southern company with white work force which told employees
that the national union pressured its local offices to back segregation efforts).
151. NLRB v. Baltimore Luggage Co., 387 F.2d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1967) (finding proper
statement that union would help better conditions of blacks and had traditionally been friend
of blacks); Archer Laundry, 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965) (certifying election where union had
equated support for unions with support for Martin Luther King Jr. and civil rights).
152. NLRB v. Sumter Plywood, 535 F.2d 917, 929 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1092 (1977).
153. 701 F.2d at 706.
154. 656 F.2d at 58 n.7.
155. 138 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
156. Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 71 (The Board referred to the statements approved in Allen-
Morrison and noted that "[w]e would be less than realistic if we did not recognize that such
statements, even when moderate and truthful, do in fact cater to racial prejudice.").
157. Allen-Morrison, 138 N.L.R.B. at 73.
158. Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 67.
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legitimate purpose of informing workers of the union's racial policies, while
the latter served mainly to inflame and exacerbate racial feelings. 5 9
Prohibiting inflammatory appeals, therefore, does not extend to any
implicit appeal to racism, emotion, or other allegedly irrelevant factors.
Rather, the prohibition is on communications that primarily inflame and
arouse rather than educate and inform. 6° The Board's purpose is to provide
"elections in which the employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots
for or against a labor organization in an atmosphere conducive to the sober
and informed exercise of the franchise.''6 To the extent possible, the Board
seeks to promote rational debate in union elections.
The goal that motivates the Board's policy is democracy: to ensure that
the outcome of the election reflects the true wishes of its employees. 62 In
choosing to pursue this goal by voiding elections where certain speech has
been uttered, the Board implicitly assumes that not all speech is beneficial.
Rather, it assumes that sometimes free speech can "prevent or impede a
reasoned choice. 163 This is in marked contrast to the reigning assumption
in the unregulated marketplace of political advertising that "robust, unin-
hibited debate" is best achieved without restriction on speech.
Commentators have argued that the Sewell standard violates the first
amendment.' 6 ' However, virtually every circuit has adopted Sewell.'16 To
date no court has even considered the possibility that it might violate free
speech, except to note that a similar regulation could not constitutionally
be applied to candidates campaigning for political office.'" Two justifica-
tions for the standard have been suggested. First, the standard derives from
the Board's power to regulate the conduct of union elections to ensure that
they reflect the true choices of employees. Thus, the Board's actions have
the primary purpose of furthering the first amendment free association
159. Allen-Morrison, 138 N.L.R.B. at 75; Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 71.
160. Pollitt, supra note 142, at 401 (Sewell distinguishes between "speech intended to inflame
and speech intended to inform.").
161. Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 70.
162. Id. at 69-70 (The Board seeks "'to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may
be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires
of its employees."') (quoting General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948)).
163. Id. at 70; see also Katz, 701 F.2d at 707 ("The relevant legal inquiry is whether the
inflammatory remarks could have impaired the employees' freedom of choice in the subsequent
election.").
164. Bok, supra note 142, at 68-71; Pollitt, supra note 142, at 401-08. But see Motley,
supra note 142 (arguing standard is constitutional).
165. NLRB v. Utell Int'l, 750 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1984); Arlington Hotel v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1983); Silverman's, 656 F.2d at 58; Peerless of America v. NLRB,
576 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1978); Sumter Plywood, 535 F.2d at 929; Baltimore Luggage, 387 F.2d
at 746.
166. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
778 n.3 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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rights of employees to choose to belong or refrain from belonging to a
union, a purpose unrelated to the suppression of speech. 67
Second, it has been suggested that the domination and superior bargaining
power of the employer justifies greater restrictions on their speech. 68 The
Court has upheld restrictions on the degree to which an employer can claim
that the election of a union will cause economic troubles to the company,
for example, on the ground that because of the employer's dominant
position, such statements are likely to be interpreted as a threat. 169 This
rationale is not obviously applicable to inflammatory statements because
such statements are not necessarily threatening. 70 Theoretically, both the
strong and the weak economically can inflame others to gain their support.
However, if management does dominate and has an inherent advantage,
restrictions on inflammatory statements might be advisable to prevent man-
agement from exploiting that advantage by distracting the employees from
the issues that are most germane to the election.
The Labor Relations Board's regulation of inflammatory propaganda in
certification elections reveals startlingly different assumptions about speech
and political debate than those generally associated with first amendment
jurisprudence. The experience indicates that speech, even political speech,
is sometimes regarded as dangerous and destructive of free speech and free
choice and that we can and do distinguish between rational debate and less-
valued emotional appeals.
D. The Case for Format Restrictions on Political Advertising
When one considers the nature of current political advertising, the case
for requiring or encouraging the use of formats that are more likely to
produce informative debate about prospective policy choices facing the
country is even more compelling than it is for the restrictions in union
certification elections. There are three reasons why this is so.
First, speech in the context of political elections cannot be considered in
a vacuum. While there may be important first amendment self-realization
interests in allowing people to speak in the manner that they choose, these
interests are less important in an election where the first amendment and
democratic interests of the whole society to make an informed choice of its
leaders are at stake. Speech in an election not only expresses the individual
views of the speaker, it also affects the nature of the election process. In
labor certification elections, for example, it is thought that an inflammatory
statement can deprive employees of the sober environment that they require
167. Pollitt, supra note 142, at 379-80.
168. See Motley, supra note 142, at 435.
169. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
170. See Bok, supra note 142, at 69.
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in order to make a reasoned choice about the prospective union. Because
the unfettered exercise of the union's and employer's free speech could
potentially intrude upon the associational rights of the employees to choose
or decline a union, a restriction on individual speech rights is tolerated.
Similarly, restrictions on avenues of individual expression in election cam-
paigns are defensible if they have the effect of enhancing the first amendment
interests of the society in self-governance and the receipt of adequate
information to make an informed choice in the election.
Second, the concern that the dominance of monied interests may adversely
affect the nature of political debate justifies greater efforts by the govern-
ment to make political debate during election campaigns as substantive as
possible. It is frequently noted that debate during elections often ignores
those issues that are most central to the future of the nation. One explanation
for this phenomenon is that because dominant economic interests shape
politics the most crucial issues of economic and social structure are inten-
tionally pushed to the margin of politics so that they are not subject to
public scrutiny and democratic decisions. 171 Encouraging or requiring the
use of formats that are more likely to require discussion of substantive
issues makes it more difficult-although certainly not impossible-for pol-
iticians to obscure the important issues by using the various tactics discussed
previously.
Third, format restrictions on the manner in which a speaker imparts a
political message do not tend to endanger core first amendment expression
rights. Format restrictions can be termed "content-based" if they are
motivated by the communicative impact of the speech in question. 72 Pro-
posed format restrictions aim to prohibit or discourage certain formats and
to require or encourage the use of other formats. These formats are based
on the degree to which the content of the speech most likely to be produced
in a certain format is thought conducive to informed and reasoned political
discussion. However, they are not traditional content regulations because
they do not discriminate between speech based on its viewpoint, its subject
matter, or even the precise words used.1 7 1 In fact, the proposed format
restrictions do not prevent the speaker from saying anything or expressing
any idea at all.
E. Dangers Posed by Format Restrictions
Nevertheless, a restriction on form poses potential dangers to free speech.
These dangers are of two types. First, there is the danger that a format
171. Fiss, supra note 123, at 1406 (discussing C. LINDBLOM, PoLmcs AND MAR=S: THE
WoR.LD's PoLmcAL-EcONOIEC SYsTEms (1977)).
172. L. TYaBE, supra note 72, § 12-2.
173. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); L. TRmE, supra note 72, § 12-3.
[Vol. 67:663
FORMAT RESTRICTIONS ON ADS
restriction will inhibit the expression of disfavored ideas, either because it
is enforced in a biased manner or because a bias is built into the format
restriction. Second, there is the danger that a format restriction will impov-
erish public debate, even as it succeeds in creating more rational advertise-
ments. This impoverishment can occur if the format restriction hampers the
communicative impact of advertising or if it significantly diminishes the
overall quantity of political speech.
1. Suppressing Disfavored Ideas
The first concern is that restricting formats will make it easier for the
government to suppress ideas. The Court in Cohen v. California'74 expressed
this concern when it faced the question of whether the state could consti-
tutionally punish an individual for wearing a jacket with the words "fuck
the draft" into a courthouse.1 7 5 The question for the Court was primarily
one of the limits on regulation of form. 17 6 Under the state's theory, Cohen
was free to express the abstract idea that he opposed the draft. He was
simply prohibited from expressing it in a manner that "maliciously and
willfully" disturbed the peace or involved "offensive conduct.' ' 7 7 Never-
theless, the Court reversed the conviction, reasoning, in part, that if it
allowed this kind of regulation "governments might soon seize upon the
censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the
expression of unpopular views.' 7 8
This is undoubtedly a serious concern, particularly regarding the regulation
of election advertising. Because the same government that would enforce
any restriction also would have an interest in remaining in power, there
should be concern that the government would intentionally enact restrictions
that would tend to "further government policies or favor established political
elites.' 79 However, this concern does not justify a prohibition on any
governmental interference with political advertising. Americans already tol-
erate a significant degree of governmental intrusion into the speech
174. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
175. Id. at 16. Cohen is thoughtfully discussed in Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An
Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California,
1980 DuKE L.J. 283.
176. See Farber, supra note 175, at 284 (Cohen was primarily concerned with whether the
state could "purify" public discourse in the interest of creating a more tolerable climate for
thought and discussion rather than with the captive audience problem.).
177. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
178. Id. at 26.
179. Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 651 (1982); see also L. TamE, supra note 72,
at 1129 ("The fear that a prevailing government might some day wield its power over political
campaigns so as to perpetuate its rule generates a commendable reluctance to invest government
with broad control over the conduct of political campaigns.").
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marketplace from time, place, and manner regulations80 to actions by the
police to protect dissenters and facilitate free speech' to subsidies for the
arts and other expression.8 2 Were one to take seriously the notion that any
governmental involvement in speech will necessarily be abused by the state
to serve its own ends, all of these long-established intrusions would have
to end. Instead, one learns to recognize the state "not only as an enemy,
but also as a friend of speech; like any social actor, it has the potential to
act in both capacities," and one can and must "discriminate between
them."'
A government regulation is most dangerous when it creates the potential
for repeated governmental application of open-ended standards, with the
resulting possibility that biases against certain ideas will adversely affect the
government's enforcement of that regulation. In Cohen, for example, the
challenged statute prohibited "offensive" conduct and "maliciously and
willfully" disturbing the peace.' 84 There was, therefore, a danger that the
police and the courts would enforce this vague prohibition in a way that
punished the expression of disfavored views. 5
The Court has repeatedly emphasized this potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement in striking laws on overbreadth and vagueness
grounds.8 6 The same concern also underlies the doctrine that a law requiring
a permit to parade or picket or a license to engage in expressive activity is
generally void on its face if it vests complete discretion in a state official
to grant or deny a permit or license.8 7 The danger of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of format restrictions would appear to be strong-
est in the context of administrative adjudication, because the decisions of
administrative agencies might be heavily influenced by political considera-
tions and pressure from the government.' Even purely judicial involvement
can be dangerous, however, because in every case in which a judge would
180. E.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
181. E.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978).
182. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
183. Fiss, supra note 123, at 1416.
184. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16.
185. There is a good chance that this actually occurred in Cohen's case. Farber, supra note
175, at 287 ("The trial judge imposed a sentence of thirty days in jail. This harsh sentence,
for what was at most a juvenile prank, is hard to understand except as the consequence of
either a puritanical attitude toward Cohen's language or, worse, strong hostility to Cohen's
political views.").
186. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466 (1987); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972).
187. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 452-53 (1938).
188. Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 99-100 (stating as a reason for striking the New York election
codes as unconstitutional the fact that the code allowed for administrative enforcement without
review).
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have the power to approve, disapprove, or otherwise regulate a political
advertisement, there would be the potential that the judge's unconscious
biases against unconventional or unpopular ideas would adversely affect the
judge's decisions.8 9 A related problem with elections is that repeated ad-
judications of any sort-even if evenhanded-might disrupt the electoral
process and diminish public confidence in it.
This concern reveals why any scheme for a more extensive case-by-case
policing of election advertisements would probably violate the first amend-
ment. Such schemes would include proscribing advertisements that tend to
mislead but are not intentionally false, 190 as well as schemes to prohibit
advertisements that are unnecessarily inflammatory. The NLRB's experience
in union certification elections demonstrates that any case-by-case review of
election advertisements would probably spawn a complicated jurisprudence
and questionable distinctions and possibly void a significant number of
election results. At the very least, such a scheme would significantly disrupt
the political process. More likely, it would also deter campaign speech as
candidates struggled to avoid coming within the prescriptions of the regu-
latory regime.
A format restriction will not raise these problems if it employs clear
standards that can be understood and followed without the need for
substantial adjudication and interpretation. Examples in other contexts
include the clear and uniform restrictions that cities and towns have placed
on speech in certain places and during certain times.19'
A second concern, also raised by the Cohen Court, is that any format
restriction would necessarily affect the communication of ideas and infor-
mation because one cannot regulate the form of speech without also
regulating its content. 92 This is particularly true with respect to a regulation
of form that is designed to favor rational debate over emotional appeals:
Much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication,
but otherwise inexpressible emotion as well. In fact, words are often
chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive
function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be communicated. Indeed, as
189. See L. BOLLINGER, Tx TOLERANr SociETY 78 (1986).
190. See Hinerfeld, supra note 8.
191. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(upholding rule prohibiting posting of campaign signs on public property); Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) (upholding ordinance prohibiting
posting of political advertisements on city busses).
192. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. ("[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process.").
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "[o]ne of the prerogatives of American
citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures-and that
means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation." 9,
This too is a serious concern. However, the greatest danger is that the
restriction on form, while neutral on its face, would tend to restrict speech
most critical of the status quo. Thus, the Court has wisely restricted the
authority of the states to prohibit offensive speech, 194 fighting words, 95 or
incitements to imminent lawless action, 96 because such prohibitions are most
likely to diminish the effectiveness of speech that is most derisive and critical
of the existing order. Therefore, this concern should not be elevated to a
rejection of any kind of restriction on the format of political advertising.
Instead, any proposed restriction on political advertising must be closely
scrutinized to ensure that it is neutral, that is, that it does not have the
primary purpose or effect of inhibiting speech that is critical of government
officials or conduct.' 97
2. Impoverishing Public Debate
Two additional problems present the danger that a format restriction
might actually curtail the communication of information and ideas necessary
to election campaigns. The first problem is that a restriction on the form
of speech might impede its ability to communicate effectively to listeners.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,98 the Court struck down an
Ohio disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising with pic-
tures, noting that "[t]he use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements
serves important communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the
audience to the advertising's message, and it may also serve to impart
information directly."' 99 The attorney in Zauderer had placed an advertise-
ment in newspapers showing a picture of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine
193. Id. (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
194. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15.
195. The fighting words doctrine was first articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) and continues to be cited by the Court. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989) (citing but not applying doctrine). However, in practice the Court has so
narrowly construed the doctrine that many commentators consider the fighting words exception
to be moribund. E.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (striking as
overbroad a statute that went beyond precise limits of the Chaplinsky Court's definition of
fighting words); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (restricting fighting words
doctrine to face-to-face confrontations).
196. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
197. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. Ras.
J. 521 (Speech critical of the government and directed to checking government abuse should
receive strongest constitutional protection.).
198. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
199. Id. at 647.
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Device. Underneath was the caption "Did You Use This IUD?" followed
by information relating to the kind of injuries associated with the Dalkon
Shield and the name, address, and phone number of the law firm.200 The
advertisement had been highly successful, generating numerous inquiries and
eventual lawsuits on behalf of 106 women.20' The Ohio rule did not
necessarily prevent the attorney from communicating any of the information
contained in the advertisement. However, the Court was apparently con-
cerned that the state's restriction on the use of pictures might prevent
attorneys from communicating this information effectively to prospective
clients. This concern recognized that one of the interests served by the first
amendment is the interest in the public having appropriate information and
ideas necessary to make choices for themselves. 202 Any restriction on formats
of political advertising, therefore, must be closely scrutinized to ensure that
it does not unduly restrict the communicative impact of the speech.
A final concern is that a format restriction would reduce the overall
quantity of speech. In Buckley, for example, the Court struck down expen-
diture limits in federal election campaigns noting that they "necessarily
reduced the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of the exploration, and the size of the audience
reached." 203 Theoretically, the quality of speech is more important to first
amendment values than sheer quantity. However, distinguishing between
"good" and "bad" political advertising is not always possible, and at-
tempting to do so is likely to chill valuable political dialogue. Therefore, it
seems correct to assume that, all other things being equal, more speech
generally leads to better discussion of the issues and more access to infor-
mation. Even misleading or irrelevant information in a campaign may
prompt criticism of such speech and lead to a more productive discussion
of issues relevant to the campaign. Given the recurrent criticism that
contemporary culture is often preoccupied with entertainment, sports, or
materialism rather than with probing questions of public policy and gov-
ernment, it hardly makes sense to risk curtailing the present quantity of
political discussion. Therefore, any format restriction must be analyzed in
light of the degree to which it would tend to reduce the quantity of political
advertising and of overall information to the voter.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPOSED FORMAT RESTRICTIONS
ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING
Applying the previously discussed criteria to the proposed restrictions
yields a limited but adequate opportunity for the government to elevate
200. Id. at 630-31.
201. Id. at 631.
202. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. 748.
203. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
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political debate through format restrictions. Proposals that mandate format
restrictions for all advertisements-the personal appearance and the talking-
heads requirements-are unconstitutional because they would suppress a
significant amount of speech that can be quite effective at communicating
ideas and information to voters. Narrowly tailored disclosure requirements
are probably constitutional. However, they probably would not improve
significantly the level of public debate. Most promising are proposals to
provide candidates with free advertising, subject to format restrictions likely
to encourage candidates to make issue-oriented advertisements. These pro-
posals would add a particular kind of advertising to the political marketplace
without curtailing other modes of expression favored by candidates.
A. Personal Presentation of Negative Advertising
Requiring a candidate to personally present negative campaign advertise-
ments is inconsistent with freedom of expression and illustrates the potential
dangers of permitting format restrictions by an incumbent government. 204
Its most obvious flaw is that it is not neutral with respect to the viewpoint
of the advertisement. It singles out speech that is critical of a candidate
and subjects it to greater restrictions than speech that endorses a candidate.
Candidates who engage in such "positive" advertising are free to use
whatever media enhancements and third-party spokespersons that they de-
sire, while a negative attack must be made "in person."
The effect of this proposal would be to eliminate the most widely used
and most effective negative advertisements because placing the candidate in
the advertisement would often blunt the ads' effectiveness or risk backfiring
on the sponsoring candidate. 20 5 Most negative advertising operates by as-
sociating the opponent with something perceived to be bad in order to
create fear, uncertainty, and anxiety about that candidate. 201 Generally the
technique used is to impose the picture of the favored candidate only at
the end of the advertisement, so that the candidate emerges as the resolution
to the fear, uncertainty, or anxiety that is associated with the opponent.207
If the candidate appears visually in a negative advertisement, she risks being
associated with the problem rather than emerging as its solution.2 8
204. Most commentators who have examined the personal presentation requirement have
concluded that it is unconstitutional. E.g., Matheson, supra note 99, at 127-29, 132.
205. See M. KERN, supra note 2, at 78.
206. Id. at 102-107. This is particularly the case with what Kern calls "hard sell" negative
emotional advertising, which employs threatening music, dark colors, and harsh sound effects
to create a particularly intense feeling of dread. Id.
207. Id. at 33. This technique borrows from the "get 'em sick, then get 'em well" theory
of commercial advertising, in which a product is presented as the solution to a problem which
the consumer is shown to have. Id. at 30.
208. Id. at 79.
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The proposal also would necessarily prevent or greatly impede the use of
a number of popular techniques used in negative advertising. These include
the use of the candidate's family, the use of an actor or other celebrity, or
the use of constituents from the opponent's district to criticize her record.2°9
Also impeded would be the use of visual images that may be highly relevant
to a pressing issue, such as a war210 or the need for environmental controls. 21'
Significantly, the proposal would impede or eliminate "neutral reporter"
advertisements, which employ visuals and an offscreen announcer to com-
pare the opponent's record or positions with those of the favored candi-
date.212 Such advertisements, while less frequent now than in the past, can
provide valuable information to the voter in a rational manner.213 Finally,
research has shown that the techniques used in current negative political
advertising can be quite effective in communicating information to voters
and interesting them in the political process. Voters tend to remember
negative advertisements longer than positive ones precisely because the
negative advertisements are hard hitting, entertaining, and stylistically in-
teresting. 214 Thus, the effect of a personal presentation of negative cam-
paigning requirement would be to render less effective advertising that is
critical of a candidate.
There is no legitimate government interest in suppressing or inhibiting
negative advertising. The increasing prevalence of negative advertising 25 has
prompted considerable criticism from the popular press and from candi-
dates. 216 From the standpoint of providing information to voters, however,
this criticism is probably unjustified. Although negative advertising can be
criticized for all the reasons outlined in Part I, there is no indication that
negative advertising per se is less informative or provides a less-meaningful
discussion of issues than positive advertising. Indeed, because negative
advertising often focuses on specific positions or actions of an opponent,
209. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 62 (statement of Barry Lynn, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union).
210. E.g., M. PFAu & H. KENsKI, supra note 2, at 7 (an Eisenhower ad).
211. Dwinell, Talking Heads Ignores Body and Soul, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS Jan.-Feb.
1989 (arguing that candidates should be able to demonstrate their stand on environmental
issues with images of nature, such as a beach).
212. M. KERN, supra note 2, at 49; Jamieson, supra note 21, at 18-19.
213. Jamieson, supra note 21, at 18-19 ("[N]eutral reporter ads ... are rational political
ads that offer factual data, invite or stipulate a conclusion, and warrant that conclusion.").
214. M. PFAU & H. KENsKI, supra note 2, at 2-4.
215. Id. at 13-59 (noting a significant growth in negative advertising); M. You2o, THE
AMRIcAN DICTIONARY OF CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 60-61 (1987) (One out of two candidate
advertisements is negative, up from one out of five in 1962, and 80% of advertisements
sponsored by independent groups are negative.); Guskind & Hagstrom, In the Gutter, NAT'L
J., Nov. 5, 1988, at 2782 (noting increase in negative advertising on state level).
216. Much Ado About Ads Knocking Candidates, BROADCASTING, Sept. 16, 1985, at 64.
19921
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
negative advertisements may well be more informative than positive adver-
tisements. 217
Particularly troubling is the fact that negative advertising has traditionally
been employed more by challengers than by incumbents. 218 This is because
the incumbent can often afford to rest on name identification, while the
challenger can best attract attention initially by tarnishing the incumbent's
image. Thus, a personal presentation requirement might operate to make it
more difficult for challengers to win and to dampen enthusiasm for incum-
bents.2'9 This is intolerable, since first amendment protections are most
necessary for speech that is critical of the status quo and that advocates
change. 20 Negative advertising can force a candidate to face certain issues
or defend aspects of her record that she would rather avoid. Negative
advertising can thus help keep an incumbent accountable for the positions
that she has taken and her acts in office. For these reasons, any proposal
that would curtail the effectiveness of negative advertising, as would the
personal presentation requirement, should be held unconstitutional.
B. Talking Heads
A requirement that all advertisements have a talking-heads format is more
evenhanded than the personal presentation requirement but is still consti-
tutionally troubling. The case most pertinent to this proposal is Zauderer.2
217. Garramone, Atrim, Pinkleton & Cole, Effects of Negative Political Advertising on the
Political Process, 34 J. OF BROADCAST AND ELECTONIC MEDIA 299, 300-01 (1990); Joslyn,
supra note 10, at 160.
218. M. PFAU & H. KENsKI, supra note 2, at 13-60. This trend may be changing. Guskind
& Hagstrom, supra note 215 (noting incumbents are beginning to use negative advertising
more at the outset of a campaign).
219. This has led some to charges that the Clean Campaign Act is intended to protect
incumbents from challengers and increase their chances of remaining in office. 1985 Hearings,
supra note 57, at 80, 101, 121 (statements of Terry Dolan, Chairman, National Conservative
Political Action Committee, and Robert Heckman, Chairman, Fund for a Conservative
Majority).
220. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("Debate on public issues
... may well involve vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials."); Blasi, supra note 197.
221. 471 U.S. 626. Zauderer is part of a line of cases establishing fairly strong first
amendment protection for commercial speech but allowing the state to regulate speech that is
inherently misleading or that has been used to mislead or deceive consumers. See Peel v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm., 110 S. Ct. 2281, 2287 (1990); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council v. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see also Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (State may not regulate
truthful advertising concerning lawful activity unless regulation directly advances a substantial
governmental interest and is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.). Com-
mercial speech has been defined narrowly to include only speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-21 (1975).
Political advertising, therefore, cannot be considered commercial speech, but the analogy is
still helpful because if a format restriction would not survive scrutiny under commercial speech
doctrine, it would also be unconstitutional under the more rigorous protection accorded political
speech.
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In Zauderer, the state sought to prohibit the use of pictures in advertising
because the use of visual images "creates unacceptable risks that the public
will be misled, manipulated, or confused."mn The state argued that it would
be impossible to police deceptive visual advertising on a case-by-case basis
because the advertiser is skilled in subtle uses of illustrations to play on
the emotions of his audience and convey false impressions. Because
illustrations may produce their effects by operating on a subconscious
level, the State argue[d], it [would] be difficult for the State to point
to a particular illustration and prove that it is misleading or manipula-
tive.m
The state, therefore, argued that a prophylactic bar of visual advertising
was justified.22 The Court rejected this argument, noting the advertisement
in question was not deceptive and the state had presented no evidence that
it could not continue to regulate visual advertising on a case-by-case basis
for deception, as it already did for other attorney advertisements and as
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) did for visual advertisements.22
In an earlier case, however, the Court had suggested that the "special
problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media, will warrant
special consideration. 22 6 Expanding on this suggested distinction, three
states have restricted the use of visual images in advertising by attorneys
on television, requiring instead a format thought more conducive to con-
veying information? 27 The courts have upheld such restrictions, reasoning
that the unrestricted use of television would probably produce advertisements
more likely to appeal to a person's emotions or fears than provide the
information necessary to make an intelligent choice regarding the selection
of an attorney? 8 In fact, the Supreme Court dismissed an Iowa case
222. 471 U.S. at 648.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 648-49.
226. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 673 n.1 (O'Connor, J. concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
227. The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 461 (Fla. 1990) (Television advertisements may not contain dramati-
zations, all information must be articulated by a single voice, and only lawyers who will be
providing the advertised services may appear in the ad.); IowA CODE OF PROFSSIONAL RES-
PONsmILUrY FOR LAwYERs DR 2-101(5) (West 1991) (Television advertisements for attorney
services may contain no visual display except printed words articulated by a single nondramatic
voice and no background sound.); NEw JERSEY RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 7.2(a)
(West 1991) (Television advertisements for attorney services may not contain drawings, ani-
mation, dramatization, music, or lyrics.); see also Baker v. Registered Dentists of Okla., 543
F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (striking down ban on television advertisements by
attorneys but noting misleading nature of medium and suggesting abuses might be better
corrected by prohibiting celebrity endorsements).
228. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1224-25 (S.D. Iowa
1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); Florida Bar, 571 So. 2d at 457-58.
Petition of Felmeistler & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 201-02 (N.J. 1986); Committee on Professional
Ethics v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1985),
reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1165 (1986).
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upholding the most stringent of these restrictions for want of a substantial
federal question,z29 an action that is generally treated as equivalent to a
judgment on the merits. 2 0
These cases suggest a coherent argument for mandating similar restrictions
for political advertising. 21 If the premise of these states' regulations is
correct, restricting the use of images and dramatizations will tend to prohibit
advertising that primarily exploits emotions or stylistically promotes a can-
didate, while permitting advertisements that tend to be informational. Cer-
tainly, there is at least as strong an interest in encouraging advertising that
provides information to voters in an election as to consumers of legal
services. Furthermore, televised advertisements arguably are more likely to
mislead voters and obfuscate issues than the print advertising protected
from regulation by Zauderer; while print advertising is fixed in a tangible
medium that can be studied and considered, television images are by their
nature transient and therefore may be less susceptible to rational consider-
ation.23 2
Finally, a talking-heads requirement appears to be the most narrowly
tailored way of prohibiting manipulative and substanceless political adver-
tising. In Zauderer, the main reason the Court gave for striking the state's
prohibition of pictures was that the state could instead regulate false and
deceptive advertising on a case-by-case basis. Such case-by-case adjudication
is impossible with respect to political advertising. While commercial adver-
tising can be regulated if it has a tendency to mislead, only intentional or
reckless falsity can be regulated if the speech is political. Any more com-
prehensive case-by-case policing of political advertising would necessarily
involve repeated application of indefinite standards, which would disrupt
the electoral process and deter campaign speech. The scope for permissible
case-by-case adjudication is so narrow that it could not even prevent
misleading and deceptive advertising, much less make advertising more
informed. By contrast, a clear, uniform requirement that all advertisements
229. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1985). Prior to this
dismissal, the Court had vacated an earlier Iowa Supreme Court decision with the same result
for reconsideration in-light of Zauderer. Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 355
N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1985), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985).
230. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). However, such a disposition is probably
not entitled to the same precedential weight as a decision on the merits. Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981). In fact, one commentator has suggested that a
dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question is entitled to scarcely more weight than a
denial of certiorari. Winnick, Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the
Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v.
Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 508, 511 n.19, 518-19 (1976).
231. See Winsbro, supra note 30, at 912-16 (arguing that a talking-heads requirement for
televised political advertisements is constitutional).
232. See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 646.
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be of a minimum length and contain only a candidate addressing the camera
would be unambiguous and easy to administer.
While the case for requiring a talking-heads format for all televised
political advertising cannot be lightly dismissed, a close analysis reveals that,
whatever its merits for attorney advertising, such a restriction would be
intolerable for political advertising because it would sharply curtail the
quantity and the communicative impact of political speech. First, it is not
clear that a talking-heads requirement would necessarily permit full expo-
sition of the ideas that are most crucial in an election. The idea that a war
engaged in by the government is unjust or unwise, or that more environ-
mental controls are needed, can often be expressed more vividly in images
than in words.23 This is so not only because the picture conveys more
emotion, but also because it more clearly evokes the reality of war or of
pollution than any sterile recitation of statistics.
Second, the advertisements that are common today are chosen because
they are effective at attracting the attention of voters and being remembered.
Many advertisements convey valuable information to voters. Others may
initially attract voters' attention so that they are drawn to follow the election
and perhaps investigate the issues and the candidates more closely. While
few would dispute that many advertisements do not convey the information
voters need, the fact that they convey any information at all or interest
voters even minimally is significant. 234 If the advertisements most likely to
attract attention are effectively banned, the communicative impact of the
relatively dull advertisements that remain may be significantly less. 523 Fur-
thermore, making advertisements less visual will be most likely to prevent
advertisements from reaching those who are poor, uneducated, or illiterate,
persons who already vote in disproportionate numbers. This same concern
has been expressed with respect to attorney advertisements. Thus, the Model
Rules and the vast majority of states permit unrestricted television ads on
the theory that more information will reach people who need access to legal
services, particularly people of modest income. 21 6
Third, there is a possibility that such restrictions would result in signifi-
cantly fewer political advertisements. 2 7 Some feel this would be beneficial
because it would force candidates to reach the voters in more meaningful
ways, such as by public speeches and face-to-face campaigning. 23 However,
233. See supra text accompanying notes 197-99.
234. Cf. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374 ("Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on
which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that
the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an
informed choice.").
235. In Zauderer, for example, the attorney's illustrated advertisement generated over 200
inquiries while an unillustrated version attracted none. The Supreme Court-1984 Term,
Leading Cases, 99 HAsv. L. Rav. 193, 198-99 (1985).
236. See MODEL RurEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT, Rule 7.2 comment (1983).
237. E. DiAmoND & S. BATES, supra note 2, at 383-84.
238. Id. at 384-87.
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a regime that could result in significantly less speech has to be regarded
with some skepticism. There is some indication, for example, that the
increased importance of the broadcast media in political campaigns has
made the political parties more democratic, less secret, and more accountable
to the public. 239 A significant reduction in the influence of political adver-
tising might well have adverse effects on the participation and influence of
the public in election campaigns.
Restricting political advertising to a talking-heads format, therefore, raises
significant free speech problems. It could impair the effective communication
of important ideas, make advertisements less likely to reach and involve
voters, and substantially reduce the overall quantity of political advertising.
Such eventualities make a talking-heads restriction on political advertising
both unwise and unconstitutional.
C. Disclosure and Identification Requirements
The government's interest in keeping candidates and independent groups
accountable for their advertisements can best be served through narrowly
tailored disclosure and identification requirements. The government has an
interest in voters knowing the source of a communication so they can better
judge its message. The Court has generally upheld disclosure requirements
that provide valuable information to the public. 241
A valid concern is that a disclosure requirement might disparage a
particular message, communicate to others that they should not give it
weight, or give a false impression. In Riley v. National Federation for the
Blind,242 the Court struck down a requirement that professional fund raisers,
when conducting solicitation drives, disclose at the beginning of every
solicitation for a charity the average percentage of gross receipts actually
turned over to the charity by the fund raisers for all charitable solicitations
conducted in the state in the past year. The Court noted that such a
requirement would tend to dissuade potential donors or encourage them to
view the fund raisers with suspicion before the fund raiser had a chance to
discuss the charity.243 More importantly, the Court observed, the required
disclosure was misleading because it gave the impression that there was
something corrupt about using a professional fund raiser or that a charity
239. Id. at 373.
240. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 478 (1987).
241. Meese, 481 U.S. 465 (upholding statutory scheme that labeled certain materials produced
by a foreign government "political propaganda"); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-53 (State could
require attorney advertisements to state that clients might be liable for litigation costs, even if
their suit was unsuccessful.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding
requirement that candidates reveal size and source of contributions).
242. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
243. Id. at 799-800.
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received no benefit from using a professional fund raiser. Neither was
necessarily true, since a professional fund raiser helped a charity in making
more people aware of its activities.244 If the state was concerned with
disclosing to donors that some of their donations would go to the fund
raiser rather than to the charity, the Court indicated that it could accomplish
this by requiring that fund raisers disclose their professional status.u 5
This doctrine indicates that the question of whether a disclosure require-
ment is constitutional has no talismanic answer. The Riley Court suggested
one when it stated that "[m]andating speech that a speaker would not
otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech. [It is] therefore
... a content-based regulation of speech." 2" However, this statement is
puzzling in light of the almost casual manner in which the Court upheld
disclosure requirements in Buckley, Zauderer, and Riley. The fact that a
disclosure is mandated in the context of speech cannot alone make it virtually
unconstitutional per se. Rather, the outcomes of the cases suggest that a
more fact-based inquiry is appropriate. If a disclosure requirement merely
provides pertinent information, it should be upheld. However, if it tends
to interfere with the content of the speech in such a way as to unfairly
suggest that its message should be devalued or regarded with skepticism, it
is more suspect. A disclosure requirement is not constitutionally troublesome
because it intrudes upon the autonomy of the speaker. It is constitutionally
troublesome because of the degree to which the requirement hinders the
communication of information and ideas to others.
Applying these criteria, the case for more stringent disclosure requirements
for advertising sponsored by independent groups is fairly straightforward.
The existing identification requirements are quite modest.2 7 In practice,
independent groups make them so small that advertisements will sometimes
be wrongly attributed to a candidate to her detriment.2" There is also the
possibility that an independent group will take advantage of the group's
244. Id. at 798-99. Lower courts have similarly struck requirements that a fund raiser
disclose the percentage of gross receipts that will be retained by the fund raiser on the ground
that the requirements wrongly presume that a charity obtains no benefit from the money it
pays to fund raisers. Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Ass'n v. Pearson, 700 F. Supp. 421, 442-
44 (S.D. Ind. 1988); People v. French, 762 P.2d 1369, 1374-75 (Colo. 1988). But see City of
El Paso v. El Paso Jaycees, 758 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App. 1988) (upholding requirement that
fund raiser disclose approximate percentage of funds that will go to fund raiser).
245. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11. At least one court has upheld a state regulation to this
effect. Pearson, 700 F. Supp. at 442.
246. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
247. 2 U.S.C. 441d(a)(3) (1988) (Ad must "clearly state the name of the person who paid
for the communication and state that the communication is not authorized by any candidate
or candidate's committee.").
248. Gaynor, Note, Curbing Injurious PAC Support Through 2 U.S.C. § 441d, 35 HASTINGs
L.J. 869, 869-70, 874-76 (1984).
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relative anonymity to cover up its biases regarding the issue addressed by
the advertisement.2 9
The Court has indicated that at times a group has a first amendment
right to remain anonymous when disseminating political messages.n ° How-
ever, such decisions rest on the need to protect unpopular groups from
persecution.2'1 Requiring disclosure of the source of campaign materials
serves the important governmental interest of providing pertinent informa-
tion to voters, while still leaving open the opportunity for persecuted groups
anonymously to protest the government's policies or oppressive practices
through pamphleteering or other speech not connected with an election. 2
It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts have uniformly upheld the
federal identification requirements for campaign advertisements. The courts
have reasoned that the peculiar interest in preserving accountability in
election campaigns justifies an identification requirement for campaign
speech and that, in any case, groups who have access to the television media
and can afford to advertise there are not the kind of groups that are so
subject to persecution that an absolute right to anonymity is required. 2 3
The specific proposals regarding independent advertising still raise con-
stitutional problems. The requirement that the source of the message be
broadcast continuously and take up a certain percentage of the screen could
blunt the impact of the advertisement and distract the viewer. It also might
convey implicitly to the viewer that there was something wrong with an
advertisement that was not affiliated with a candidate. The government's
interest in disclosing the source of the advertisements could probably be
adequately accomplished by requiring a full-screen announcement at the end
of the advertisement. Even better, the announcement could inform viewers
that further information about the group was available by writing to or
calling a specified address or number. 254 These changes would ensure that
249. In Massachusetts, for example, the utilities who control the Seabrook nuclear power
plant produced television advertisements advocating nuclear power, under the purported
sponsorship of the umbrella organization, the Coalition for Reliable Energy (CRE). Critics
charged that the advertisements gave the false impression that CRE was a disinterested grass
roots organization. See Massachusetts Lawsuit Assails Seabrook Ads, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15,
1987, at § 1, 42, col. 1.
250. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (striking state law requiring all handbills to
contain name and address of person or group which prepared and distributed it); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down requirement that NAACP disclose names of its
members).
251. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462-63.
252. United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
253. Id.; United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961).
254. Cf. Telco Communication, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1231 (4th Cir. 1989)
(upholding statute requiring professional solicitors to disclose in writing that financial statements
for the previous fiscal year are available from the state consumer affairs office), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1923 (1990).
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valuable information is provided to voters, without affecting the substantive
content of the advertisements.
The proposed requirement that the candidate appear at the beginning or
end of every advertisement raises slightly different concerns. Ensuring that
viewers are informed that the candidate is responsible for the advertisement
could probably be accomplished by requiring a prominent picture of the
candidate with a statement that the candidate or candidate's campaign
committee paid for the advertisement.2 15 However, the purpose is not to
identify the source of the advertisinge 6 but to link the candidate firmly to
the advertisement. Research indicates that in time viewers will tend to
disassociate the content of an advertisement from its source.2 7 As a result,
candidates and advertisers may feel that they are not fully accountable for
the advertisements. Advertisers may be more careless about making false
and deceptive statements, and candidates may permit such carelessness by
allowing their media advisers to distribute advertisements without personally
approving them. Requiring a brief appearance by the candidate, it is thought,
will encourage candidates to personally monitor advertisements that will be
firmly linked to them. A candidate's campaign generally knows the most
about the claims that are made; thus, increased monitoring inside the
campaign will make it more likely that the statements in the advertisement
will be true.
It is disconcerting that the candidate identification proposal is motivated
in part by hostility to negative advertising 58 However, as long as the
candidate would have the option of placing the appearance at the end of
the ad, it would not deter negative advertising. Most advertisements usually
do refer to the favored candidate at the end after the attack on the opponent,
in order to present the candidate as the resolution to the problems and
dangers associated with the opponent. 9 Furthermore, the appearance would
not affect the content of the advertisement any more than do the present
identification requirements. The one thing the candidate would be unable
to do would be to focus entirely on her opponent without conjuring up her
own image. However, the interest in accountability and in ensuring that
255. 42 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(l) requires advertisements sponsored by a candidate or a campaign
committee to clearly state who paid for the advertisement. However, in practice consultants
often attempt to make the reference to advertising sponsorship so fleeting that most viewers
might not notice it. See CAMPAIGN ADVERTIsnNG AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1991, supra note 94.
256. Indeed, it appears that voters are likely to assume that every advertisement endorsing
a particular candidate is sponsored by the candidate.
257. M. PFAU & H. KINsKI, supra note 2, at xiii.
258. Some of the Representatives and Senators who spoke in favor of a bill containing an
identification requirement argued that the bill was desirable because it would help stop negative
campaigning. E.g., 137 CONG. REc. S480 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Boren);
id. at 5479 (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 136 CONG. REc. H6867 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Penny); id. at H6858 (statement of Rep. Price).
259. M. KRPN, supra note 2, at 33.
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voters are reminded of the importance and consequences of their decision-
namely that one candidate will take the office and the others will not-
would seem to justify a candidate identification requirement.
In sum, disclosure and identification requirements are constitutional so
long as they are narrowly tailored either to provide information to voters
or to link advertisements to the candidate who authorized them. Proposals
that do this, without changing the message or diminishing the effectiveness
of the ads, are constitutional. Disclosure and identification requirements,
however, will do little to improve the level of public debate during elections.
Even if they are completely successful, they will deter, at most, false
statements and inform voters as to the interests and motivations of the
independent groups participating in the political process. They will not in
any, way make advertising more likely to address the issues or stimulate
rational political debate.
D. Free Advertising Proposals
The proposals most likely to elevate political debate are those providing
candidates with free advertising on the condition that the candidates agree
to conform to a talking-heads format and agree to create advertisements of
a minimum length conducive to a meaningful discussion of issues. Such a
proposal would not only make it more likely that issue-oriented advertising
would be produced, it also could be structured in a way that would focus
public and press scrutiny on free advertisements and away from paid spots.
For example, Taylor argues that providing five-minute spots for each
candidate alternating each night for the last four weeks of the presidential
campaign would generate greater public scrutiny of what the candidate said
during the five-minute spot than of the paid advertisements. 260 It would
also create some expectation that the candidate would address issues during
that time, thereby pressuring the candidate to do so. A successful advertising
proposal could therefore change the nature of political debate during elec-
tions, although in ways that might cause candidates to prefer that it had
stayed the same. This part of the Article analyzes two potential first
amendment obstacles to free-advertising proposals: that the free-advertising
proposal imposes an unconstitutional condition and that it unduly infringes
on the editorial discretion of broadcasters.
1. Unconstitutional Conditions in Free Political Advertising
A free-advertising proposal with a talking-heads format raises an uncon-
stitutional conditions problem because it "offers a benefit on condition that
260. P. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 268-71.
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the recipient perform or forgo an activity that a preferred constitutional
right normally protects from government interference. ' 261 In order to obtain
the free advertising, a candidate must surrender her discretion as to choice
of format. This is a discretion that the government could not restrict directly.
One could rather superficially argue that a free-advertising proposal does
not impose an unconstitutional condition because the candidate who chooses
not to accept the free advertising loses nothing other than the offered
benefits. A free-advertising proposal can thus be termed an offer, rather
than a threat.262 The proposal does not threaten the candidate with the loss
of an interest that she already has; it merely offers her a new option,
subject to conditions. One might say that the free-advertising proposal
involves a nonsubsidy rather than a penalty. Providing free advertising with
conditions simply reflects the government's decision to subsidize advertising
that follows a certain format and not to subsidize other advertising. 263 The
candidate who declines to accept the subsidy is not penalized because she
did not face the loss of anything external to the declined benefit.
The Court's recent decision in Rust v. Sullivan26 demonstrates that the
Court sometimes succumbs to the temptation to engage in the above analysis
and allows the government to restrict even the viewpoint of speech as long
as the governmental regulation can be termed a decision not to fund a
particular activity. Upon analysis, however, it is apparent that such distinc-
tions among threats and offers and subsidies and penalties are inadequate
to distinguish an unconstitutional condition on the acceptance of free
advertising from a permissible condition. A requirement that a person who
accepts funding from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) agree
not to produce obscene art, for example, is neither a penalty nor a threat.26
Neither is a law that subsidizes the speech of all who agree to join the
Democratic party.26 In both cases, the individual is not coerced into losing
anything other than the subsidy itself, if they decline to accept it. Yet both
are unconstitutional. The former is unconstitutional because it chills pro-
tected speech. 267 The latter is unconstitutional because the government is
illegitimately using its power to advance the expression of one viewpoint
over another. 261 Similarly, it can hardly be imagined that the Court would
also approve a regulation that forbade a legal servicet lawyer from advising
a client to file an action for a breach of the warranty of habitability or of
261. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HAxv. L. REv. 1415, 1421-22 (1989).
262. See Simons, Offers, Threats, and Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DEGO L. REv.
289, 311 (1989).
263. See L. Tama, supra note 72, at § 11-5; Sullivan, supra note 261, at 1439-42, 1464-68.
264. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
265. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
266. See L. TRmE, supra note 72, at § 11-5.
267. Bella Lewitzky, 754 F. Supp. at 782-83.
268. L. TRIBE, supra note 72, at § 11-5.
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other legal rights, even though such a regulation would be analytically
difficult to distinguish from the situation in Rust.
Whether a condition is constitutional, therefore, should turn not on
whether the condition can be termed a decision not to subsidize a particular
activity, but on the substantive effect it has on free expression. 269 A free-
advertising proposal could certainly have the effect of changing the nature
of political debate. Because the advertising spots would be free, candidates
would likely elect to use the spots if they thought that the spots would help
them in any way. Once guaranteed this free exposure, candidates might
find less need for paid advertising and diminish their use of it.27o Even if a
candidate would otherwise choose not to use the free advertising, they might
be pressured to use it to avoid being criticized by their opponent or the
press for avoiding the issues.
These significant effects are all consistent with free speech. First, the free
advertising would probably not reduce the total amount of speech. Indeed,
if candidates continue to run paid advertisements in the same manner as
before, the total amount of political speech during campaigns would be
increased. The only reason that candidates might reduce the number of
advertisements that they run would be if they found that the free adver-
tisements were actually so effective at conveying their message that additional
advertising was unnecessary. Second, because the restriction requires only a
conventional format, it is not biased against the expression of any ideas or
viewpoints. Third, requiring a talking-heads format does not require repeated
intrusion into the political campaigning process or the application of vague
standards that might chill speech or create a potential for arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement. A requirement that free advertising feature the
candidate addressing the camera without the presence of other visuals,
dramatizations, or music would be easy both to describe and to enforce.
The effect that a free-advertising proposal is most likely to have, if
successful, is to give an advantage, as measured against the present state
269. See Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 337, 338 (1989) (Whether a condition is constitutional should be a function of the
constitutional right at issue, not of an independent constitutional conditions doctrine.). The
Rust decision is therefore incorrect to the extent that it relies on the characterization of the
regulation as a government decision not to subsidize abortion counseling. The Court's decision
might better be explained either as resting on skepticism that the regulation would significantly
affect the ability of a clinic doctor to give frank advice to a patient or as a sub silentio
holding that the right to an abortion is so insignificant that it can be substantially regulated
and restricted.
270. In economic terms, one could say that the subsidy for one commodity, advertising
with restrictions, will reduce demand for unrestricted advertising, a competing commodity.
The adverse effect of a subsidy on competition is evidenced by the fact that antitrust law
generally prohibits "predatory pricing," or selling a product in competition below cost. III P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 711 (1978). A government subsidy, however, is immune
from antitrust liability. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-63.
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of affairs, to candidates who are best able to articulate and defend con-
vincing policy proposals. This is legitimate since those are among the
qualities most valued in a potential leader. It would be improper for the
government to prevent candidates from advocating other reasons why they
should be elected. 271 However, this proposal would only give candidates an
opportunity and incentive to engage in a type of advertising that tends not
to be employed currently because shorter and more creative advertising is
thought to be a more effective use of scarce funds and because broadcasters
are reluctant to run longer advertisements. If the voters choose to ignore
the free advertising and focus on the attributes and image portrayed in paid
advertisements, free advertising will not impede them from doing so. How-
ever, if people focus on free advertising and base their decisions on it, free
advertising will provide voters with additional information relevant to their
choices.
In this way, free advertising is similar to public funding for campaigns,
which has been upheld by the courts. 272 Assume that candidate A is able to
raise a maximum of $100,000 while candidate B can only raise $50,000.
The Court in Buckley held that government could not eliminate A's advan-
tage directly by limiting its spending. 273 But it could accomplish much the
same end by matching a candidate's expenditure, provided that the candi-
dates spend no more than a certain amount. If the government sets the
limit at $50,000 and then provides matching funds of up to $50,000, it
eliminates A's financial advantage. Both A and B will each have $100,000.
The direct expenditure limit is therefore not invalid because it infringes
upon a candidate's right to outspend its opponent, for public funding
infringes upon that "right" as well. Rather, the Court's decision to inval-
idate the limitation can only be justified on the basis that expenditure limits
curtail the access of the public to the communication of ideas and infor-
mation by reducing the overall quantity of speech during election cam-
paigns.274
Similarly, the current state of political advertising gives an advantage to
the candidates who can afford to produce it and who are best able to use
271. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) ("Given the realities ot our
political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a candidate might be
altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks.").
272. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65; Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (three judge court), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
273. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
274. This analysis suggests that Buckley may have been incorrectly decided if it overvalued
the importance of maintaining the same high volume of campaign speech and undervalued the
improvement in political dialogue that could result as a result of more balanced campaign
expenditures. To the extent that the Buckley Court hinged its ruling on the fact that the
government was restricting or enhancing individual candidates' abilities to convey their message
to voters, the decision was flawed because voluntary expenditure limits similarly alter the
relative quantity of candidates' speech.
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its limitations to convey their message. The government cannot eliminate
this advantage directly by requiring all advertisements to conform to a
talking-heads format. However, the government can diminish that advantage
by subsidizing advertising if candidates employ a talking-heads format. Both
free advertising and public funding alter the range of choices that a candidate
would otherwise have. Yet both are permissible because they help to
compensate for wealth inequalities between candidates and encourage in-
formative advertising without hampering the communicative impact of ideas
and information to the voter.
A free-advertising proposal with a talking-heads condition is constitutional
because it advances free expression by providing additional avenues for
political debate without curtailing those that already exist. It is important
to reiterate that the argument being made here is not that the government
can accomplish indirectly, through funding conditions, what it cannot
accomplish directly by mandating a talking-heads restriction. Rather the
argument is that the two proposals do two very different things. A proposal
to mandate a talking-heads format for all advertisements also mandates the
kind of political debate that will take place. By contrast, the free-advertising
proposal merely gives candidates the opportunity to use an avenue of
expression that is not used frequently because of financial constraints and
the restrictions sometimes imposed by networks on the length and timing
of political advertisements.
Two additional objections to the free-advertising proposal can be raised.
One objection is that it would tend to favor candidates who look good on
television.275 A candidate's ability to use television has been important at
least since the elections of 1960. It is unlikely that a free-advertising proposal
mandating a talking-heads format would significantly exacerbate this phe-
nomenon in a time where sound bites, interviews, press conferences, and
candidate debates are commonplace. What it would do is give an advantage
to a candidate who was interesting and dynamic in discussing issues and
the future of the country. That is preferable to giving an advantage to a
candidate who because of superior funding is able to hire better media
advisers.
A second objection is that the proposal would tend to coerce candidates
to engage in a certain kind of advertising when they would rather not do
so. One might be concerned that through this proposal the government
would aggrandize the power to affect the nature of election debate that
would otherwise be held by a candidate. However, our whole democratic
system is premised on the idea that the press and the public will "coerce"
the candidate to address their questions and concerns even if the candidate
does not want to. Indeed, after the 1988 campaign, many argued that the
275. Dwinell, supra note 211.
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press needed to become more aggressive about policing the accuracy of the
candidates' statements and forcing them to address issues. There is no
reason why the government cannot work to achieve these goals as well, as
long as it does so in an evenhanded manner that minimizes the dangers
posed by government intrusion.
Thus far, this Article has considered a pure free-advertising and talking-
heads proposal in which the advertising is free and the format restriction
is conditioned on nothing other than an acceptance or rejection of the paid
advertising. Under such a system, the candidate's decision of whether to
use the advertising will hinge entirely on the candidate's assessment of
whether the format will be helpful in "conveying a message and whether the
public will listen.
At least two other variations are possible and should be considered. One
possibility is that the government would condition other benefits, such as
public funding, on advertising that adhered to a particular format. Such a
proposal would be constitutionally troublesome because the candidate's
decision to use the free advertising would be motivated by external conditions
other than the perceived effectiveness of the advertising. The effect of this
proposal would be that a particular kind of advertising would be more
prevalent simply because the government decided to encourage it. Because
the advertising would be free, such a proposal would not cut off other
avenues of expression; and because only a talking-heads condition would
be mandated, there would be no danger that the restriction would be used
to affect the message of the advertising. Therefore, such a proposal might
well pass constitutional muster. The proposal is slightly more problematic,
however, because it allows the government to alter the nature of political
debate based on little more than the government's whim. By contrast, under
the pure condition proposal, the effect on political debate is contingent only
on the candidate's judgment of what the voters would want to hear.
Even more troublesome would be a proposal that offered a reduced rate
on advertising that adhered to a restricted format. Under this proposal, the
candidate's decision to spend money on the restricted format would also
reduce the amount that the candidate could spend on unrestricted advertis-
ing. Therefore, the proposal would have the effect of reducing the number
of non-talking-heads advertisements and thus of curtailing an effective
avenue of political expression. The candidate's decision to run the cheaper
advertisements would not be motivated solely by an assessment of what was
most effective, but would also be influenced by financial considerations.
The least troubling free-advertising proposal is one that offers free talking-
heads advertising conditioned on nothing other than accepting the advertising
itself. Because a candidate's decision to use the free advertising would be
influenced by nothing other than the candidate's assessment of what would
be politically effective advertising, this type of proposal would provide
advertising that the public wants to hear but is not receiving because of
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monetary constraints, broadcaster pressure for shorter advertisements, or
the desire of the candidates to avoid formats that require them to address
issues directly. The free-advertising proposal will affect the nature of political
debate only if there is a current deficiency in the political marketplace.
Other variations on talking-heads conditions are more troublesome because
of the possibility that they would alter the nature of political advertising
independent of public preferences as expressed through the democratic
process.
This Article has argued that a free-advertising proposal should be judged
by the extent to which it enhances free expression, rather than by its
infringement on a candidate's autonomy. If this is the standard, one might
ask, why be content with merely mandating a talking-heads format? Why
not go further and require the candidate to discuss issues276 or to discuss
certain issues, such as the environment or crime? It is impossible to consider
the complete range of regulations that might be adopted. However, restric-
tions that go far beyond a talking-heads format plus a fixed minimum-
length requirement would probably pose significant dangers of suppression
of speech. A requirement that candidates discuss issues during free adver-
tising, for example, would require repeated adjudications-presumably by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)-to determine whether
particular advertisements involved "issues" within the meaning of the
legislation. This would delay the airing of certain advertisements, thus
interfering with a campaign. Worse, the standard might be interpreted with
a bias toward approving advertisements addressing conventional issues.
Advertisers might choose to create advertisements that avoid controversial
topics to avert a challenge to a particular advertisement. A requirement that
candidates discuss certain issues is similarly problematic. At a minimum,
someone would have to choose the issues. The government might attempt
to prevent the discussion of controversial or embarrassing topics in an
attempt to divert public attention from them.
2. Broadcaster Editorial Discretion
A final consideration is the extent to which free-advertising proposals
impinge on the editorial discretion of broadcasters. A requirement that
broadcasters run advertisements of certairi lengths at certain times, as some
of the free-advertising proposals require, curtails the broadcasters' editorial
discretion regarding the choice of programming, 27 7 and it does so more
276. See Arbogast, supra note 101 (proposing that the government condition the award of
the lowest unit rate for political advertising on the candidate's agreement to run one and one-
half minute advertisements in which the candidate identifies an issue, states her position on
it, and explains why she holds that position).
277. See Matheson, supra note 99, at 123-25.
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intrusively than the current reasonable access requirement. 27 However, the
editorial discretion of broadcasters, like the individual speech rights of
candidates, should be protected only to the extent that it contributes to
informed political debate during elections in particular and to free expression
values in general. 279 Currently, the exercise of unfettered editorial discretion
has resulted in electoral political debate that is carried out largely through
short, often substanceless commercials. Nothing in our constitutional system
justifies broadcasters being able to curtail public debate in this way simply
because they happen to control the airwaves. The first amendment, there-
fore, permits even intrusive infringements on broadcasters' editorial discre-
tion, as long as such infringements enhance the opportunity for informed
public debate during elections without diminishing the free exchange of
ideas and information.
The idea that editorial discretion is protected only to the extent that it
promotes free expression is fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
The Court has twice upheld significant restrictions on the editorial discretion
of broadcasters on the grounds that such restrictions enhanced the public's
access to information and contrasting viewpoints. In Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 0 the Court upheld the fairness doctrine, which granted a right
of access to persons attacked in a broadcast editorial, on the grounds that
it provided listeners and viewers with access to speech from a variety of
sources and perspectives. In CBS v. FCC,2' the Court upheld the require-
ment that broadcasters provide reasonable access to candidates, noting that
it helped ensure that the airwaves were used in the public interest. 212
More importantly, decisions protecting broadcasters' editorial discretion
have also evidenced a concern with the impact of this discretion on the
flow of information and ideas to society.28 In FCC v. League of Women
Voters,- the Court struck down a prohibition on the airing of editorials
278. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988); see Kako, Note, The Right of Reasonable Access for
Federal Political Candidates Under Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 78 CoLwi.
L. REv. 1287 (1978).
279. See Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add
to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTINGs L.J. 639, 653-54 (1975) (The press cannot be said to
have rights of self-fulfillment or self-expression. Their rights derive from the interests of a
self-governing people to hear all possible views bearing upon political decisions.).
280. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
281. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
282. Id. at 397.
283. 453 U.S. 367. Arguments that Red Lion is no longer good law because there is no
longer spectrum scarcity do not undermine the claim that the editorial freedom of the
broadcaster should be protected only to the extent to which such freedom contributes to free
speech. The FCC ultimately abandoned the fairness doctrine, not because it abridged the
autonomy of broadcasters, but because the agency felt that the rule undermined free speech
by deterring the press from airing personal attacks. In the Matter of Inquiry into Section
73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 159 (1985).
284. 468 U.S. 364, appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
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by public broadcasting stations, noting that editorials were crucial to free
expression because they provided the public with ideas, information, and
critical judgment. 25 In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,'2 6 the Court
affirmed the FCC's refusal to require broadcast licensees to accept all paid
political advertisements. In doing so, the Court emphasized that the FCC
decision was consistent with providing the public with a balanced presen-
tation of viewpoints, because a first-come, first-served rule would permit
those wealthy enough to afford repeated purchases of editorial spots to
dominate public debate.287 Neither League of Women Voters nor CBS can
be explained solely as upholding the right of broadcasters to editorial
discretion. Instead, the decisions rest at least partly on the beneficial impact
that the editorial discretion would have on the public's access to information
and ideas.
In the context of election campaigns, one can determine whether a
proposed restriction on the editorial discretion of broadcasters is consistent
with free speech by examining the degree to which it diminishes or enhances
the role that the broadcast media plays in our system of free expression.
Essentially, broadcasters carry out two functions: that of a conduit of
information and ideas and that of a critic, analyzing the information
provided and critiquing the viewpoints of others.2 s
A free-advertising proposal undermines neither of these functions. Free-
advertising proposals actually enhance the media's role as a conduit by
providing the public with longer and more issue-oriented advertisements that
might otherwise not be aired. Some possible restrictions on editorial discre-
tion could undermine the media's role as a conduit. A contingent access
requirement, such as that formerly proposed by Senators Hollings and
Danforth, ' 8 9 might dissuade broadcasters from airing advertisements to avoid
triggering the access requirements 290 and deter groups from airing the attacks
to avoid giving the disfavored candidate free air time. 29 Similarly, restric-
285. Id. at 382.
286. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
287. Id. at 123.
288. For other formulations of the free speech functions served by the press, see Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Hv. L. REv. 1641, 1653-56 (1967)
(Free expression requires that media allow expression of ideas that would otherwise not be
aired before the public.); Nimmer, supra note 279, at 653-58 (The press helps preserve a
democratic dialogue by providing information and opposing viewpoints to the public.).
289. S. 999, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989) (A candidate who is attacked by independent
advertisements would receive free response time of equal length.). For analysis of this provision,
compare Matheson, supra note 99, at 129 (arguing provision is unconstitutional) with Clinger,
Note, The Clean Campaign Act of 1985, 3 J.L. & POL. 727 (1987) (arguing provision is
constitutional).
290. Matheson, supra note 99, at 129; see also L. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and
Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REv.
1, 29 (1976).
291. Matheson, supra note 99, at 93.
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tions that prevented the media from providing certain information or
viewpoints or that displaced a substantial portion of broadcast programming
with programming mandated by the government would undermine the
media's role as a conduit by curtailing the ideas and information that it
provided to the public. Free-advertising proposals do not present this
problem because they provide the public with more information relating to
election campaigns without significantly reducing the flow of information
provided through a broadcaster's regular programming. Even the most
ambitious of the free-advertising proposals would only consume a few hours
of air time each year.292 As long as the length was five minutes or less,
such advertising could fit in between programs. 293
Free advertising proposals also do not diminish the media's critical
function. The restriction struck down in League of Women Voters dimin-
ished the critical function by depriving broadcasters of one of their primary
tools of critical analysis. The same would be true for any restriction on
television's ability to provide news and news analysis. Free-advertising
proposals leave the broadcast media completely free to continue its analysis
and criticism of the election.
A regulation that diminished the broadcaster's choice of programming to
such a degree that the government was in fact determining the nature and
content of programming would also threaten the broadcast media's critical
function. Such a regulation would give the government the power to control
the agenda of public discussion by controlling the nature of ideas and
information disseminated to the public. Free advertising does not raise this
concern because the government is only requiring political discussion; it is
not dictating the content of that discussion.
Finally, a government regulation that so entangles the media with the
government that it gives the government the power to influence the content
of broadcast news and programming threatens the critical function of the
broadcast media. The most obvious example would be direct censorship. A
less obvious example would be a symbiotic regulatory regime in which the
government and broadcasters were constantly interacting on a variety of
issues. Such a system could make the broadcast media reluctant to threaten
the government lest the government retaliate by exercising its regulatory
power in a way that injures the media actor.29 To some extent, this
government entanglement in the broadcast industry may already exist. In
any case, a free-advertising proposal certainly does not exacerbate it. As
previously discussed, a rule that required the broadcast of advertisements
of certain length at certain times is easy both to describe and to enforce.
292. L. SABATO, supra note 4, at 31.
293. An effective free-advertising proposal should probably not require advertisements longer
than five minutes because longer advertisements tend to lose their audience. Id. at 34.
294. See Bollinger, supra note 290, at 29-31.
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It does not require continuing supervision and enforcement by the govern-
ment.
In sum, the free-advertising proposals do not infringe either the autonomy
of candidates or the editorial discretion of broadcasters in ways that diminish
free speech values. In fact, they enhance such values by providing voters
with potentially valuable, issue-oriented advertising. Therefore, free-advertising
proposals are consistent with the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
It is an interesting paradox of our constitutional system that a society so
dedicated to democratic decision making is virtually alone among industri-
alized democracies in taking no regulatory steps to improve the level of
public debate during elections. The apparent premise behind this hands-off
approach is that enlightened public debate is best achieved through an
absence of government regulation. However, an analysis of both the nature
of contemporary political advertising and of free speech principles reveals
that this assumption is unrealistic. Government not only can, but it should
take affirmative steps to improve the level of public debate during elections.
It is irrelevant that such restrictions infringe on the autonomy of candidates
and broadcasters. The predominant concern should be to create opportu-
nities for more informed public debate.
That being said, however, one cannot countenance format restrictions on
political advertising based on nothing more than a congressional finding
that such restrictions will elevate political debate. The healthy fear we should
have that restrictions might be imposed by the government to serve its own
ends, as well as the subtle and multifaceted nature of televised communi-
cation, mandates a rigorous analysis of proposed format restrictions to
determine whether they enhance or diminish free expression. This analysis
can be accomplished by examining format restrictions in light of their effect
on the communicative impact and quantity of campaign speech, as well as
by examining the potential that the restrictions will be used to suppress
disfavored ideas.
Applying this analysis to proposed format restrictions reveals that the
scope of permissible restrictions is modest. Proposals that restrict the
permissible formats for political advertising endanger free speech because
they would blunt the impact of advertising that is highly effective at
communicating ideas and information to voters. The most promising use
of format restrictions is to provide information and discussions to voters
that would otherwise not be aired. This can be accomplished by disclosure
requirements or, most effectively, by providing free advertising to candidates
on the condition that the candidates produce advertising that conforms to
an issue-oriented format. In addition, identification requirements can make
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candidates more accountable for their advertising and thus more careful
about its content.
The relative modesty of permissible reforms should not obscure their
significance. The free-advertising proposals, if properly structured, may
create pressures and expectations that can make campaigns more substantive.
Furthermore, the restrictions illustrate that society need not simply accept
substance-free campaigns as the inevitable outcome of freedom of speech.
By carefully considering the effects of regulation on free speech values,
government can fashion regulations that create opportunities for the rational
political dialogue that is necessary for the proper functioning of our dem-
ocratic system of government.

